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OF GIVING AND TAKING: APPLICATIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS OF CITY OF LOS ANGELES, 
DEPARTMENT OF WATER & POWER v. MANHART 
Michael Evan Gold* 
Fortune's a right whore. 
If she give aught, she deals it in small parcels, 
That she may take away all at one swoop.l 
J.N City of Los Angeles, Department of Water & Power v. 
Manhart,2 the United States Supreme Court held that an em-
ployer's retirement plan violated title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.3 as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
1972.4 because a female employee was charged a higher rate of con-
tribution than her male counterpart.5 The case appeared to be a 
significant victory for women in their battle for equality. If the 
rationale of the opinion is applied consistently to other practices of 
. retirement plans, women will be entitled to equal monthly benefits 
as well as equal rates of contribution. Nevertheless, women may 
have won the battle and lost the war: an unnecessary piece of obiter 
dictum in the opinion authorizes an employer to maintain a sever-
ance pay plan into which equal contributions for male and female 
counterparts are deposited. The Court thus may have taken with 
one hand what it gave with the other, because the coexistence of 
conventional retirement plans and severance pay plans could create 
two unwholesome forces: (1) a motive, based on a desire to increase 
profit, for employers to discriminate against women; and (2) a ten-
dency, based on a desire to maximize compensation, for employees 
to segregate themselves by sex according to the nature of employers' 
retirement plans. 
* Assistant Professor, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell 
University; B.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1965; LL.B., Stanford University, 1967. 
An earlier version of this paper was presented to a seminar at the New York State School of 
Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University. The author is grateful for the construc-
tive criticism of his colleagues, particularly John Burton, who also organized the seminar. 
1
 John Webster, The White Deuil, I. i. 4 (J. Brown ed. 1960). 
* 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
3
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1976). 
' Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1976)). 
5
 Counterparts are a man and a woman who share the same birthdate, entered the em-
ployer's service on the same day, have identical employment histories, and either are still 
working or retired on the same date. 
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After discussing the background and the rationale of the Manhart 
opinion, this article presents a brief description of the various types 
of retirement plans. Attention then centers on practices of retire-
ment plans that treat men and women differently. The first issue is 
whether defined contribution plans should be treated differently 
from defined benefit plans. This article argues that the two types 
of plans should be treated alike because both are operated on insur-
ance principles. The focus then shifts to the issue whether a woman 
is entitled to the same monthly retirement benefit as her male coun-
terpart. Based in part on the distinction—which is commonly ig-
nored—between the nominal and the real contributors to a retire-
ment plan, this article asserts that monthly benefits must be equal 
for counterparts. Next considered are options commonly offered by 
retirement plans, such as the joint and survivor annuity. This arti-
cle argues that the sex of beneficiaries must be disregarded in the 
allocation of benefits. 
This article next explores the economic implications of the var-
ious applications of Manhart. Because women outlive men, equal 
contributions and equal monthly benefits for counterparts make 
women more costly employees than men. Employers who realize 
this fact will be tempted to hire fewer women or to pay them less 
money. Equal contributions and equal monthly benefits also often 
mean that men must subsidize women's benefits. A man therefore 
can increase his compensation by working for an employer who has 
either no retirement plan or a severance pay plan, while a woman 
can increase her remuneration by working for an employer who 
maintains a conventional plan. Rational employees will tend to go 
where their compensation is maximized, producing two results: 
(1) men and women will work for different employers, according to 
the nature of their retirement plans; and (2) to the extent that this 
process is completed, women will receive lower monthly benefits 
than their male counterparts. Each of these consequences occurs 
because the Supreme Court distinguished in Manhart between con-
ventional retirement plans and severance pay plans, a distinction 
that this article argues is unnecessary and should be abandoned in 
favor of a policy of treating all retirement plans according to the 
same rules. 
I. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE 
The risk of longevity is the chance that a person will outlive his 
ability to support himself. Without a retirement plan (and ignoring 
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the social security system), each individual bears the risk of longev-
ity on his own. Some people assess the risk as substantial, and 
others do not. Members of the latter class do not save money from 
current income to use during old age, and they are of no further 
interest here. Those individuals who do perceive a substantial risk 
of longevity believe that they should save a portion of their income. 
A few succeed in saving adequately for the future. They accurately 
judge how much to save, discipline themselves to reach their goals, 
and have the good fortune either to choose productive investments 
or to purchase and remain current on substantial annuity contracts 
from reputable insurance companies. This group too is of no further 
interest. However, many members of the class that believes in pro-
tecting itself against the risk of longevity try to save for the future 
and fail. Some simply misjudge the amount needed; their savings 
or annuities turn out to be inadequate. Others run afoul not of the 
risk of longevity itself, but of the risk of providing for the risk of 
longevity: they are unable to save money or make payments on 
annuity contracts, or they lose their savings in bad investments.6 To 
protect against the risk of longevity, and the risk of providing for 
the risk of longevity,- many employers—including the De-
partment of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles7 (the 
' The distinction between the risk of longevity and the risk of providing for the risk of 
longevity can be illustrated in hypothetical terms. Suppose A, who is concerned about the 
possibility of living beyond his employable years, provides for the risk of longevity by invest-
ing 10% of his monthly income in corporate stock. The risk of providing for the risk of 
longevity is the possibility that the stock will become worthless. The risk of the stock's 
becoming worthless is independent of the risk of A's living past age 65. A would invest in the 
stock, however, only if he perceived a significant risk of longevity. Although the probabilities 
are statistically independent, from A's perspective the risks are closely related: A will take 
the risk of providing for the risk of longevity only if the risk of longevity appears significant. 
' None of the courts that heard the Manhart case ruled on the effect of the Department's 
status as a public, as opposed to a private, employer. The Department did raise the issue in 
its opening brief to the Supreme Court, advancing the theory suggested in Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 n.ll (1976), that applying title VII to a public employer is an 
improper exercise of congressional authority. The Department posited (1) that Congress may 
apply anti-discrimination laws to the states and their agencies only to the extent authorized 
by the fourteenth amendment, and (2) that Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), held 
that the fourteenth amendment prohibits only intentional discrimination, provided that ra-
tional classifications are used. The argument concluded that, in light of the rationality of the 
Department's plan and the absence of discriminatory intent, application of title VII in this 
case would not be a permissible exercise of congressional power. Brief for Petitioner at 38, 
City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). A counterargu-
ment would maintain that the enabling clause of the fourteenth amendment gives Congress 
power to interpret and apply the amendment, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-
56 (1966), and that the courts should respect the judgment of another equal branch of govern-
ment. 
Regardless of whether title VII constitutionally may be applied to require a state to aban-
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"Department")—have established retirement plans for their em-
ployees. 
Rather than involve an insurance company, the Department 
maintained its own retirement plan.8 The risk of providing for the 
risk of longevity was handled by withholding a percentage of each 
eligible employee's compensation, adding money from the Depart-
ment's budget, and depositing the two contributions into a fund 
that was invested by prudent advisors. The risk of longevity* was 
managed by operating the retirement plan on insurance principles. 
The Department's actuaries computed how much money was 
needed to provide pensions for the entire class of covered employees. 
Knowing that some retirees would outlive others, the actuaries took 
account of this fact in determining how much money had to be 
contributed in regular increments in order to have sufficient funds 
on hand to meet future liabilities. The Department then raised the 
necessary money through employer and employee contributions. 
Comparably situated employees made equal contributions, though 
some certainly would outlive others. Thus for the purpose of esti-
mating the plan's liabilities, the varying longevity of retirees was 
important but, for the purpose of funding the plan, the varying 
longevity of retirees was ignored. Each employee traded the chance 
that he would predecease the average person, and thus receive in 
benefits less than he and the Department had contributed on his 
behalf, for (1) the certainty that after retiring he would continue to 
receive an income for life, and (2) the possibility that he would 
outlive the average person and receive total benefits exceeding the 
contributions. In one sense, the risk of longevity was not fully elimi-
nated because the retiree's monthly check might not be as much 
money as he truly needed. Yet because the monthly benefit was 
calculated with reference to, among other things, his final year's 
don practices having the effect—but not the intent—of discriminating against protected 
classes, surely the fourteenth amendment permits the use of title VII against a state practice 
intended to discriminate. In Manhart the Department undoubtedly intended to treat women 
and men differently. Perhaps in the courts' view, the purposeful nature of the discrimination 
pretermitted the need to decide the constitutional issue. 
8
 The plan was not entered into the record. 435 U.S. at 705 n.3. The author is familiar with 
the contents of the plan because he was co-counsel to the plaintiffs in the trial court. See 
Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power, 387 F. Supp. 980, 981 (CD. Cal. 
1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
• The plan insured against various risks, but only the risk of longevity was at issue in the 
case. 
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salary, there was presumably at least some relationship between the 
retiree's needs and his benefits. In another sense, however, the risk 
of longevity was completely eliminated: whether the retiree lived 
four years or forty years past retirement age, his monthly checks 
would continue to arrive. 
This description of the Department's plan gives the misleading 
impression that all employees were treated as part of the same 
group. In fact, the Department effectively operated separate retire-
ment funds for its male and female employees. Mortality tables 
showed that women, as a class, outlive men. A 65-year-old woman 
whose date of death would ultimately coincide with the sum of the 
ages at death divided by the number of deaths for her sex—the 
"average woman"—-was expected to outlive the "average man" by 
five years.10 Although the Department could not know that a given 
woman would outlive a given man, it felt that equity and fairness 
required that no man contribute money used toward a woman's 
pension. Of course, the Department also could not know which of 
two men would live longer, yet it evidently felt no compunction in 
requiring one man to contribute money that might be used toward 
another man's pension. 
A retirement plan operated on insurance principles can take ac-
count of extra female longevity in one of three ways. First, if the 
plan is to pay male and female counterparts the same benefit each 
month, more money must be raised to fund the woman's benefits 
because she will draw them for a longer period of time. If the em-
ployer is the sole nominal contributor to the plan, he must contrib-
ute more on behalf of the woman than on behalf of the man. If 
employees contribute to the plan, the woman may be required to 
contribute more than her male counterpart. Second, if the em-
ployer's contributions are to be divided equally between the man 
and the woman and—if employees contribute—counterparts are to 
make equal contributions, the reserve accounts of the counterparts 
will contain equal amounts of money when they retire. Because the 
woman's money must be divided into a greater number of monthly 
payments than the man's, the woman will receive a lower monthly 
benefit. Third, if counterparts' monthly benefits are to be equal and 
contributions by and on behalf of counterparts also are to be equal, 
some of the money contributed by or on behalf of men must be used 
'• Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581, 583 (9th Cir. 
1976), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
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to subsidize benefits for women. The Department elected the first 
of these possibilities. Each woman was required to contribute ap-
proximately 15% more to the plan than her male counterpart, the 
Department matched employee contributions at the rate of 110%, 
and counterparts received equal monthly benefits in retirement. 
The class of the Department's female employees brought suit to 
equalize the monthly contributions of counterparts, claiming that 
the Department's retirement plan discriminated against women in 
violation of title VH. The district court granted a preliminary in-
junction,11 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed,12 and 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.13 
The Department's principal argument before the Supreme Court 
asserted that "the differential in take-home pay between men and 
women was not discrimination within the meaning of § 703(a)(1) 
because it was offset by a difference in the value of the pension 
benefits provided to the two classes of employees."" Women did 
indeed pay more in contributions and receive more in total bene-
fits,,s and the Court recognized that although there are fictional as 
well as real differences between men and women, one real difference 
is that women, as a class, outlive men. The Court also recognized, 
however, that "[m]any women do not live as long as the average 
man and many men outlive the average woman."1' Because, as the 
statutory language reveals, Congress focused on the individual, the 
11
 See Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power, 38? F. Supp. 980,984 {CD. 
Cal. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 581 {9th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
12
 See Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581,592 {9th Cir. 
1976), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
'* See City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 434 U.S. 815 (1977). 
" 435 U.S. at 706. The statute provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. 
Title VII | 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). 
15
 If male and female counterparts began working for the Department at age 30 for $1,000 
per month, and continued at the same salary until retirement at age 65, the male would have 
contributed $22.20 per month for 35 years (for a total of $9,324) while the female would have 
contributed $25.49 per month for the same period (for a total of $10,705.80). See Brief for 
Petitioner at 5, City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), 
Each would receive a monthly benefit of $700, id., but, because the male's life expectancy 
was 14 years while the female's was 19 years, the male's total benefits would be $117,600 and 
the female's would be $159,600. 
'• See 435 U.S. at 708. 
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Court held that an employer may not treat individuals "as simply 
components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class."17 The 
Court elaborated: "If height is required for a job, a tall woman may 
not be refused employment merely because, on the average, women 
are too short. Even a true generalization about the class is an insuf-
ficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generali-
zation does not apply."18 It follows tha t a woman may not be 
charged a higher rate of contribution simply because she is a 
woman, one to whom a generalization about longevity may not nec-
essarily apply. 
The Department responded that equal contributions would be 
unfair to men because on the whole they die sooner than women and 
would inevitably be subsidizing the benefits of the longer-lived sex.'9 
The Court rejoined: 
But the question of fairness to various classes affected by the 
statute is essentially a matter of policy for the legislature to address. 
Congress has decided that classifications based on sex, like those 
based on national origin or race, are unlawful. Actuarial studies 
could unquestionably identify differences in life expectancy based 
on race or national origin, as well as sex. But a statute which was 
designed to make race irrelevant in the employment market . . . 
could not reasonably be construed to permit a take-home-pay differ-
ential based on a racial classification.20 
The law for race would seem to hold for sex as well, but the 
Department maintained that Congress intended to afford women 
less protection than other protected classes. The Department 
argued that the Bennett amendment to § 703(h),21 which incorpo-
rates into title VII the Equal Pay Act's exemption22 for an employ-
ment practice based on "any other factor other than sex,"23 pro-




» Id. at 708-09. 
x
 Id. at 709 (footnotes and citation omitted). 
21
 [I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this title for any 
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages 
or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentia-
tion is authorized by the provisions of section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.of 
1938, as amended (29 U.S.C. 206(d)). 
110 CONG. foe. 13647 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976)). 
* 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). 
» Id. 
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based not on sex, but on longevity. The Court disagreed that the 
Department's practice was based on a factor other than sex: 
It is plain, however, that any individual's life expectancy is based 
on a number of factors, of which sex is only one. The record contains 
no evidence that any factor other than the employee's sex was taken 
into account in calculating the 14.84% differential between the re-
spective contributions by men and women.* 
The Department further argued that the Supreme Court's 1976 
decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert25 authorized differential 
contribution rates, but the Court distinguished Gilbert on the 
ground that "[o]n its face, [the Department's] plan discriminates 
on the basis of sex whereas the General Electric plan discriminated 
on the basis of a special physical disability."26 Thus the Depart-
ment's differential contribution rates were simply sexually dispar-
ate treatment: men were treated one way and women, another. A 
showing that there was no discrimination against the class of 
women—in that their extra contributions purchased extra bene-
fits—might have rebutted a disparate impact argument, but it had 
no effect on a demonstration of disparate treatment.27 
Finally, the Court reported the Department to have argued that 
monetary relief was unjustified in this case,28 Accepting this argu-
ment, the Court denied the plaintiffs' prayer for restitution of the 
amount by which their contributions exceeded their male counter-
parts' contributions on. the grounds that (1) pension fund adminis-
trators might reasonably have believed such plans were lawful; (2) 
no reason existed to believe that the threat of monetary awards was 
necessary to keep retirement fund administrators' behavior within 
the law; and (3) such awards might jeopardize the solvency of retire-
ment plans, on which millions of workers and retirees rely.29 
u
 435 U.S. at 712. Chief Justice Burger felt that the Department's practice 
[fell] squarely under the exemption provided by the Equal Pay A c t . . . . The "other 
factor other than sex" is longevity; sex is the umbrella-constant under which all of the 
elements leading to differences in longevity axe grouped and assimilated, and the only 
objective feature upon which an employer—or anyone else, including insurance compa-
nies—may reliably base a cost differential for the 'risk' being insured. 
Id. at 727 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
a
 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (holding that General Electric's employee disability plan did not 
violate title VH by failing to include pregnancy-related disabilities). 
* See 435 U.S. at 715. 
" See id. at 716. 
a
 See id. at 707. 
n
 See id. at 719-21. Justice Marshall dissented from the dental of restitution. See id. at 
729-33 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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n. TYPES or RETIREMENT PLANS 
Two classification schemes are necessary to take account of retire-
ment plans' various features.30 One scheme focuses on whether the 
plan promises a specific level of benefits, and the other scheme is 
sensitive to the identity of the nominal contributors to the plan. 
Retirement plans may be classified as either defined benefit or 
defined contribution plans. In a defined benefit plan, beneficiaries 
are promised certain levels of benefits,31 varying according to speci-
fied factors. Many collectively bargained plans, for example, award 
benefits as a function of years of service in the industry; other plans 
take into account factors such as average compensation over a pe-
riod of time.32 Thus a defined benefit plan might provide that a 70-
year-old employee with thirty years of service and a final year's 
salary of $15,500 would be entitled to a monthly benefit of $1,000. 
In a defined contribution plan, on the other hand, no particular level 
of benefits is promised. Rather, a specific sum is contributed regu-
larly to a theoretically separate account kept for each employee, and 
upon retirement the employee is entitled to whatever level of bene-
fits his account can purchase.33 Thus a defined contribution plan 
might provide that the employee will contribute 5% of his wages and 
that the employer will match it. If the employee averaged wages of 
$15,620 per year over thirty years, total contributions under this 
plan would be $48,860. Five per cent compound interest earned on 
the contributions over the years would bring the account to approxi-
mately $.109,000. Based on annuity tables, a 70-year-old male 
retiree with this account would be able to purchase an annuity that 
yielded a monthly benefit of approximately $1,000.34 
34
 A relevant distinction may exist between a plan that is self-insured, paying benefits from 
its own reserves, and a plan that pays premiums to an insurance company, which pays out 
the benefits, A plan that is provided by an insurance company and that discriminates against 
men or women arguably is not the responsibility of the employer. When an employer uses an 
insurance company to provide retirement benefits for his employees, however, the insurance 
company is an agent of the employer for this purpose. Cf. id. at 718 n.33 ("lAJn employer 
[cannot] avoid his responsibilities by delegating discriminatory programs to corporate shells. 
Title VII applies to 'any agent' of a covered employer."). If one insurance company refuses 
to provide a nondiscriminatory plan to an employer, a competing company is likely to offer 
a lawful plan. 
" J. MELONE & E. ALLEN, PENSION PLANNING 32 (rev. ed. 1972), 
» See id. at 37-38. 
M
 Id. at 34-35. 
34
 The monthly benefit level was calculated using a table published in INSTITUTE FOR BUSI-
NESS PLANNDVG, LIFE INSURANCE DESK BOOK 366 (4th ed. 1976). A comparable sum would 
purchase a monthly benefit of approximately $880 for a 70-year-old female retiree. 
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In the theoretical model of defined benefit plans, the level of 
benefits is determined at the outset; the promised benefits then 
become the basis for calculation of the amount that must be raised 
in contributions. The potential beneficiary of a defined benefit plan 
knows in advance exactly how much he will receive in retire-
ment—given assumptions about such factors as length of service 
and final average salary. The contributors to a defined benefit plan, 
however, do not know exactly how much they will have to pay in; 
the necessary level of contribution may need adjustment if the com-
position of the work force changes, if the return on investment varies 
from predictions, or if the actuary's computations are erroneous. In 
contrast, in the theoretical model of defined contribution plans, the 
level of contribution—rather than the level of benefits—is deter-
mined at the outset. As a result, the contributors enjoy certainty; 
they never need to contribute more than they have agreed. The 
beneficiary, however, cannot know how much he will receive until 
he retires because benefits are a function of the size of his account 
at retirement.35 
In practical application, the distinction between defined benefit 
and defined contribution plans is apt to break down. The benefits 
in a defined benefit plan may be changed—indeed, they are likely 
to be increased—between the first and last years of a long-tenured 
employee's service. Factors like final average salary are also varia-
ble. Thus in a defined benefit plan an employee has little more 
advance knowledge of the amount of his actual retirement allow-
ance than does a member of a defined contribution plan. Also, the 
level of contribution to a defined benefit plan may be quite specific: 
in many collectively bargained plans, the parties to the contract 
decide exactly how much the employer will contribute to the plan. 
The actuary calculates the benefits that can be provided with this 
level of income, and these benefits are written into the labor agree-
ment or plan.31 Thus the contributors to such plans know the precise 
33
 As in the case of profit-sharing plans that allocate a fraction of profit to employees' 
accounts, the contributor may not know the exact amount of the contribution before he makes 
it. Once the periodic contribution is deposited, however, the obligation to contribute is fully 
satisfied. 
M
 The Supreme Court recently focused on a collectively bargained defined benefit plan in 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 98 S. Ct. 790 (1979). Based on an initial 
weekly employer contribution of $2 per employee, the level of benefits was set at f 75 per 
month. "Subsequent collective bargaining agreements," however, "called for greater em-
ployer contribution, which in turn led to higher benefit payments for retirees." Id. at 793-94. 
See J. MELONE & E. ALLEN, supra note 31, at 37. 
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scope of their obligation to contribute. Despite the partial collapse, 
in practice, of the defined benefit/defined contribution distinction, 
this classification scheme does provide a useful approach to prob-
lems of sex discrimination in retirement plans. 
Retirement plans may also be classified according to the identi-
ties of the nominal contributors to the plan. A plan may call for 
employees alone to contribute ("contributory plans"), employers 
alone to contribute ("noncontributory plans"), or both to contribute 
("joint contribution plans").37 This classification cuts across the 
defined benefit/defined contribution scheme: there are noncontribu-
tory and joint contribution defined benefit plans38 as well as contri-
butory, noncontributory, and joint contribution defined contribu-
tion plans. 
The Department's plan in Manhart was a joint contribution de-
fined benefit plan: both the employer and the employees contrib-
uted money,3* and employees were promised a specific level of bene-
fits.40 Employee contributions were fixed, but employer contribu-
tions were not; the Department generally made a substantial extra 
contribution in order fully to fund benefits at the time an employee 
retired.41 
3H. APPLICATIONS 
A. Defined Benefit Plans Versus Defined Contribution Plans 
Manhart involved a defined benefit plan. Although the Court did 
not rely on the type of facts that distinguish defined benefit from 
defined contribution plans, the question arises whether this distinc-
tion is relevant to sex discrimination analysis. Clearly it is not: 
the rationale of Manhart applies with equal force to defined 
17
 For a discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of contributory and non-
contributory plans, see J. MELONE & E. ALLEN, supra note 31, at 57-60. The term 
"contributory plan" frequently refers to any plan to which employees contribute, regardless 
of whether the employer also contributes. For clarity, "contributory plan" hereinafter refers 
only to plans to which employees are the sole nominal contributors. 
* The author is aware of no contributory defined benefit plans. Raising money to meet a 
funding shortfall would be difficult when only employees contribute. 
» See 435 U.S. at 705. 
a
 See id. The most common benefit was calculated by multiplying the employee's average 
monthly salary during his last year of service, his total years of service, and a specific fraction 
(0.021) applicable to all employees. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, City of Los 
Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
*' Brief for Petitioner at 5, City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 
U.S. 702 (1978). 
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contribution plans and, moreover, a close analysis reveals that there 
is no relevant difference between these two types of plan. 
As noted above, the difference between these two conventional 
retirement plans is the degree of certainty enjoyed by the contribu-
tors and the beneficiaries. In defined benefit plans, the benefi-
ciaries know in advance that a certain number of years of service at 
a particular rate of pay produces a specific monthly benefit. Al-
though the plan's actuaries attempt to foresee liabilities so that 
adequate contributions can be collected, ultimately any shortfall in 
funding becomes the obligation of the contributors. In defined con-
tribution plans, in contrast, the contributors enjoy certainty: they 
are obliged to make only the stated contributions, while the benefi-
ciaries do not know their exact level of benefits until they retire. The 
difference between defined benefit and defined contribution plans 
obviously is unrelated to whether an employee is a man or a woman. 
This conclusion alone seems sufficient reason to reject any attempt 
to except defined contribution plans from the rule of Manhart. 
Moreover, the logic of the case applies to defined contribution plans. 
A defined contribution plan that pays a woman a lower monthly 
benefit than her male counterpart" rests on the assumption that she 
will survive him because women tend to outlive men. The Supreme 
Court, however, clearly decided that average class characteristics 
cannot lawfully be applied to individuals in this context.43 
The disparate treatment of women in defined contribution plans 
may arguably be justified because the theory of such plans is differ-
ent from the theory of defined benefit plans. All beneficiaries are 
grouped into a single class in defined benefit plans44 but, in theory, 
each beneficiary has his own separate account in defined contribu-
tion plans. If fact conformed to theory, a defined contribution plan 
would be essentially the same as the severance pay plan expressly 
approved by the Supreme Court in Manhart, in which an employer 
is permitted to "set aside equal retirement contributions for each 
employee and let each retiree purchase the largest benefit which his 
or her accumulated contributions could command in the open 
" Alternatively, a defined contribution plan could charge the woman a higher contribution 
than her counterpart and provide equal monthly benefits. The author is not awaxe of any such 
plans, but they would be the actuarial equivalent of the plans described in the text. The two 
schemes should be treated in the same manner by the law. 
w
 See 435 U.S. at 708. 
" As noted above, there actually were two classes—men and women. 
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market."45 Facts, however, do not conform to theory. Defined contri-
bution plans are similar to defined benefit plans and different from 
severance pay plans in three important respects. 
First, beneficiaries of severance pay plans acquire control over the 
assets of their separate accounts at the time they retire. Such con-
trol is clearly implied in the Supreme Court's statement that retir-
ees can shop in the open market for the best contract available. In 
contrast, beneficiaries of defined benefit and defined contribution 
plans never acquire control over the assets of their funds. Whether 
the plan is self-funded or funded through an insurance company,46 
retirees receive monthly checks and nothing more. 
Second, because beneficiaries of defined benefit and defined con-
tribution plans lack title to the assets of their plans, they cannot 
make a purchase on the open market. Their range of choices is 
limited to the options offered by their plans. Beneficiaries of sever-
ance pay plans have title to a sum of money and can do anything 
with it they choose. Some may follow the Supreme Court's sugges-
tion and purchase an annuity contract from an insurance company, 
but others may invest in real estate or travel to Pago Pago. 
Third, and most important, defined contribution plans do not 
involve truly separate accounts because (1) assets are mingled for 
investment purposes, and (2) risks are pooled for benefit purposes. 
That assets are mingled for investment is obvious: managing thou-
sands of separate investment accounts would be impractical and 
unprofitable. That risks are pooled is equally clear. When an em-
ployee retires with a certain balance in his account, some method 
must be used to parcel out the money over time. The basic practice47 
computes the monthly benefit by dividing the total in the account 
by the number of months lived by the average retiree of the same 
sex.48 If accounts were truly separate, an employee's benefits would 
cease at the. average age of death for his sex, and any man or woman 
who outlived the average would have no pension thereafter. This 
does not happen, of course. Both defined benefit and defined contri-
bution plans offer a retiree a straight annuity that guarantees him 
« 435 U.S. at 717-18 (footnote omitted). 
** J. MELONE & E. ALLEN, supra note 31, at 108. 
v
 Options are generally available, but they are typically actuarial equivalents of the basic 
practice, so that what is said in the text about the basic practice is also true of options. 
** See J. MELONE & E. ALLEN, supra note 31, at 108. Because the declining balance in the 
account continues to earn interest, the actual monthly benefit is somewhat larger than this 
formula indicates. 
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benefits for life. If he elects this option and dies early, he gets no 
refund41 but, if he outlives the average, he continues to draw benefits 
until he dies. Plainly, both defined contribution and defined benefit 
plans are operated on insurance principles; the risk of longevity is 
shared by the class of retirees. In contrast, a severance pay plan that 
distributes a lump sum upon retirement does not spread the risk of 
longevity. Because no relevant difference exists between defined 
benefit and defined contribution plans, they should be treated alike 
for the purpose of sex discrimination analysis. 
B. Equal Monthly Benefits Versus Equal Total Benefits 
There appear to be no open questions concerning employee 
contributions to the three types of conventional retirement plans. 
Employees contribute nothing to noncontributory plans. Manhart 
holds that counterparts' contributions to a joint contribution plan 
must be equal, and there is no reason to treat employee contribu-
tions to a contributory plan differently from those to a joint contri-
bution plan. 
A serious question does arise, however, concerning benefits under 
all varieties of conventional retirement plans. The question is not 
whether counterparts' benefits must be equal. If a woman cannot 
be required to pay more in contributions than her male counterpart, 
surely she cannot be required to accept less in benefits. Rather, the 
question is how to measure equality of benefits. The problem occurs 
in choosing the appropriate period of time for measuring equality. 
One of two time periods may be used: a fixed number of days (for 
example, one month) or the entire span of years in which the rele-
vant events (making contributions or receiving benefits) take place. 
When the question is equality of contributions, the result will be the 
same regardless of which period is used; counterparts who are iden-
tical in all ways except sex make contributions over the same num-
ber of years1 and, if their rates of contribution are equal, their total 
contributions will also be equal. The results differ, however, when 
the issue is equality of benefits. If the appropriate period is one 
month, monthly benefits received by counterparts must be equal. 
Because women outlive men, the total of monthly benefits received 
* Contributory and joint contribution plans ordinarily guarantee that the employee and 
his estate will receive at least the employee's contributions plus interest. Such plans fre-
quently assume that the employee's contributions are paid as benefits before the employer's 
contributions are used. See id. at 52. 
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by the average woman will exceed the total received by her counter-
part. If the appropriate period is the entire span of years during 
which benefits are received, counterparts must receive the same 
total sum of retirement benefits.50 Because the woman will draw her 
benefits over a longer period of time, however, her monthly benefits 
will be less than her counterpart's. Which is the correct measuring 
period? 
1. An Evaluation of the Argument in Favor of Equal Total 
Benefits 
Those who favor equal total benefits argue that the alternative of 
equal monthly benefits is unfair because it requires men to subsidize 
women. This argument assumes that men and women are treated 
equally by retirement plans if each sex pays the same proportion of 
the cost of its own benefits and none of the cost of the other sex's 
benefits. The force of this argument would diminish (1) if each sex 
does not pay the same proportion of the cost of its own benefits in 
an equal total benefits plan, or (2) if one sex does not subsidize the 
other's benefits in an equal monthly benefits plan. As the following 
economic analysis demonstrates, both of these conditions can occur. 
a. Distinguishing Between Nominal and Real Contributors to 
Retirement Plans 
The first step in analyzing the argument for equal total benefits 
distinguishes between the nominal and the real contributors to a 
retirement plan, for the party who makes the contribution is not 
necessarily the one who bears the incidence of its cost. Regardless 
of who appears to pay into a retirement plan, the real contributors 
may be the employer, the employees, customers, or any combina-
tion of them. 
In noncontributory plans, the employer is the sole nominal con-
tributor in the sense that he is the only party who directly remits 
payments to the plan. The employer, however, does not necessarily 
bear the true incidence of the cost of contributions. He may choose 
M
 In practice, a woman receives greater total benefits because her contributions are on 
deposit for a longer period of time than her counterpart's and thus earn more interest. Men 
generally do not object to this disparity. That men's monthly benefits still exceed 
their counterparts' may obscure the difference. In addition, men may recognize that any 
claim to the interest generated by women's contributions would be inconsistent with denying 
women's claims against their own contributions. 
678 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 65:663 
to take the cost of contributions entirely out of his profits. Alterna-
tively, he may pass some or all of the cost on to customers in the 
form of higher prices for his products, or he may shift some or all of 
the cost back to his employees in the form of reductions in other 
types of compensation.81 To the extent that retirement costs are 
shifted back to employees—by granting smaller wage increases, for 
example—the employer does not change the total amount of money 
he expends for employee compensation. He merely reduces the 
amount he puts into other types of compensation by the sum that 
he contributes to the retirement plan. In this case, the employees 
effectively pay for their own pensions. To the extent that retirement 
costs are passed on to customers, wages hold steady and the em-
ployer makes his contribution to the retirement plan from the in-
creased revenue generated by higher prices.52 The employees pay 
nothing toward their pensions. Rather, employees' total compensa-
tion is increased and customers pay for pensions. To the extent that 
retirement costs are taken out of profits, the effect on employees is 
much the same as passing these costs on to customers. Only the 
source of the money—the identity of the party who bears the inci-
dence of the cost—differs. In this third case, the employer pays for 
pensions. 
In contributory plans, too, the true incidence of the cost of retire-
ment benefits may fall on the employer, the employees, or the cus-
tomers. The cost falls on the employees if wages are held constant 
and contributions are subtracted from take-home pay. The em-
ployer may shift the cost to customers by funding the retirement 
plan through increases in the price "of the company's products; 
wages are increased in accordance with the product price increases, 
and the additional wages are then withheld as the required em-
ployee contribution. The employer bears the cost if wages are in-
creased—with money taken from profits—by the amount of the 
employee's contribution. 
Similarly, in joint contribution plans—a hybrid of contributory 
and noncontributory plans—the true incidence of the cost of 
Sl
 The employer possibly could meet this cost by reducing another cost, such as his expend-
iture on rent, raw materials, or services. From the employees' standpoint, however, use of 
these alternatives would be the same as using profits. 
M
 This implicitly assumes that an employer can unilaterally raise prices and that the 
overall elasticity of demand is such that the price increase will result in increased revenues. 
For a discussion of employer alternatives in a competitive market, see text accompanying 
notes 110-17 infra. 
1979] Implications of Manhart 679 
retirement benefits is independent of the identity of the nominal 
contributors to the plan. Joint contribution plans will not be ad-
dressed in the following discussion because what is true of contribu-
tory and noncontributory plans is, of course, true of joint contribu-
tion plans. 
In any given situation, it is difficult to determine who is truly 
paying for retirement benefits. The real cost often is shared in vary-
ing proportions among employer, employees, and customers, regard-
less of the identity of the nominal contributors. For the sake of 
simplicity of expression, the following discussion will treat the three 
possible real contributors separately, with the understanding that 
what is true when a given party is the sole real contributor is true 
pro tanto when that party is one of several real contributors.53 
b. The Intent Behind and the Effects of Equal Total Benefits 
The second step of an economic approach to evaluating the argu-
ment in favor of equal total benefits identifies the intent underlying 
and the effects of disparate treatment of women in retirement plans. 
When actuaries tell plan administrators that women outlive men, 
and that therefore women's benefits cost more, employers like the 
Department must decide who should pay the "extra cost" of "extra 
female longevity." In many cases, it has been decided that men 
should be spared this extra cost, that it should be assessed to the 
class of women alone instead of being spread over the class of all 
employees." In order to assess the extra cost only to women in 
noncontributory plans, to which only the employer (at least nomi-
nally) contributes, a woman is paid a lower monthly benefit than 
her male counterpart. In contributory plans, to which only employ-
51
 The government is a fourth real contributor, operating through the tax system. For 
example, if an employer takes some of the cost of retirement benefits out of profits, he will 
pay less income tax, and the government will effectively bear part of the cost of the benefits. 
Thus, if gross profits are $100,000 and the employer bears none of the cost of retirement 
benefits, net profits after a 46% tax are $54,000. If the employer bears $10,000 of the real cost 
of retirement benefits, reducing gross profits to $90,000, $48,600 remains after taxes. The 
employer effectively pays only $5,400 of the cost of the benefits; the government bears $4,600 
in the form of reduced tax revenues. Because the role of government qua real contributor does 
not appear to affect sex discrimination analysis of retirement plans, it is ignored hereafter. 
u
 For example, nearly 2,200 educational institutions subscribe to the Teachers' Insurance 
and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), which provides 
smaller monthly payments to female members than to their male counterparts. See EEOC 
v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cix. 1978); Spirt v. Teachers' Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 416 
F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Pension Problems of Older Women: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Retirement Income and Employment of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
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ees (at least nominally) contribute, a woman can be charged a 
higher rate of contribution than her counterpart and be paid equal 
monthly benefits, or counterparts can be charged equal contribu-
tions and the woman can be paid lower monthly benefits. The intent 
of both approaches is to assess the cost of women's extra benefits to 
women alone. When contributions are equal, they are set at a level 
that will produce a sum of money sufficient to fund the benefits of 
the male counterpart. This sum must be stretched over a greater 
number of years for the female counterpart, and she is required to 
pay for the cost of her extra longevity by receiving a lower monthly 
benefit in retirement. When the woman contributes more than the 
man, counterparts' monthly benefits are equal, but the woman has 
already paid for the cost of her extra longevity by receiving lower 
take-home pay during her working years. In either case, it is thought 
that men and women are treated equally because the class of each 
sex bears the same proportion of the cost of its own longevity and 
none of the cost of the other's. 
Equal total benefits make it appear that each sex pays for the 
same proportion of its own retirement benefits but for none of the 
other's, but this appearance is false because the distinction between 
the nominal and the real contributors to a retirement plan is ig-
nored. Consideration of this distinction reveals that equality—as 
defined by proponents of equal total benefits—depends not on 
whether counterparts receive equal monthly or equal total benefits, 
but on the identity of the real contributors to the retirement plan. 
Sometimes each sexual class does pay for the cost of its own benefits 
and nothing more; other times, men pay nothing and women still 
bear the real cost of their extra longevity. 
In noncontributory plans, administrators who seek to assess the 
extra cost of female longevity to women alone pay the woman a 
lower monthly benefit than her male counterpart. When the cost of 
retirement benefits is shifted back to the employees, counterparts' 
wages (which are identical because they are counterparts) are low-
ered in equal amounts by the cost of the man's benefits. The man 
pays the full cost of his retirement benefits in the form of reduced 
wages. The woman pays only part of the cost of her retirement 
benefits in the form of reduced wages; the remainder she bears in 
the form of a lower monthly benefit. For example, assume the em-
ployer is able to pay total compensation of $1 per employee per unit 
of production. In a defined benefit plan, if the cost of funding the 
man's benefits is 10 cents per unit and the cost of funding the 
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woman's benefits is 10.14 cents per unit,55 the employer would re-
duce both counterparts' wages by 10 cents. If this level of contribu-
tion would support a monthly benefit of $1,000 for a man aged 
seventy, his female counterpart's benefit might be $880.56 In a de-
fined contribution plan, if the employer contributes 10 cents per 
unit per counterpart (with wages falling correspondingly by 10 
cents) and if the balance in the man's account is $109,000, which is 
sufficient to fund a monthly benefit for a 70-year-old male of $1,000, 
his female counterpart would receive $880 because of her greater life 
expectancy. In both types of plan, each employee effectively pays 
for the full cost of his own retirement benefits and for none of the 
cost of his counterpart's. 
When the cost of funding benefits is passed on to customers in 
noncontributory plans, it is not necessary to reduce employees' 
wages because the money for the employer's contribution comes 
from increased prices. Assuming that the woman is paying for the 
cost of her extra longevity by receiving lower monthly benefits, the 
employer needs to pass on to customers only the amount that would 
be necessary to fund the benefits for an exclusively male work force. 
The man therefore pays none of the cost of his retirement benefits, 
while the woman pays part of the cost of hers.57 Thus in either a 
defined benefit or a defined contribution plan, if a man's benefits 
cost 10 cents per unit of production, the employer would raise the 
price of the product by 10 cents times the number of employees and 
contribute this money to the retirement plan. Wages would be unaf-
fected. The man's monthly benefit might be $1,000 and the 
woman's, $880. 
When the cost of funding the retirement benefits is taken out of 
profits, the counterparts are treated as they are when the cost is 
" While the plan in Manhart used a 15% cost differential, industry figures demonstrate 
that a 70-year-old woman would pay 14% more than a man would pay for an identical 
annuity. See INSTITUTE FOH BUSINESS PLANNING, supra note 34, at 366. To maintain consistency 
in illustrations below, the 14% figure is used hereafter. 
* Derived from id. at 366. 
57
 Arguably, the man does pay for his benefits with his labor. Nevertheless, the statement 
that the man pays for none of the cost of his benefits is correct because although the man's 
compensation is increased by 10 cents per unit, his productivity remains constant. As an 
economically comparable alternative to paying lower monthly benefits, a plan might offer 
women the opportunity to receive equal monthly benefits by paying for the incremental cost 
of longevity outright, t'.e. by accepting a wage decrease of 14 cents per unit. In light of this 
option, it is clear that women do pay for their additional longevity under plans paying lower 
monthly benefits. Positing a benefits package of $1,000 per month, it is clear that men receive 
their benefits for nothing while women bear part of the cost of their benefits. 
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passed on to customers. Only the source of the money differs. Men 
pay for none of their retirement benefits, and women pay for part 
of theirs. 
In contributory plans, there are two possibilities: (1) charging 
counterparts equal contributions and paying the woman a lower 
monthly benefit, or (2) charging the woman a higher contribution 
(prior to Manhart) and paying counterparts equal monthly benefits. 
The following discussion uses only the second possibility, but is 
equally applicable to the first because both approaches are intended 
to place the cost of extra female longevity on the woman alone and 
both have the same actual—if not intended—effects. 
When the true incidence of the cost of funding retirement benefits 
remains on the employees—where of course it begins in contributory 
plans—wages remain constant and take-home pay is reduced by the 
required contribution to the plan. The woman contributes more 
than her counterpart and bears the cost of her extra longevity. For 
example, in a defined contribution plan the man might contribute 
10 cents per unit of production and the woman, 10.14 cents. In 
retirement they would receive equal monthly benefits; each person 
would pay for the full cost of his own retirement benefits and for 
none of the cost of his counterpart's. 
When the cost of retirement benefits is passed on to customers, 
the employer raises prices by an amount sufficient to allow an in-
crease in wages to match the decrease in take-home pay occasioned 
by employee contributions to the plan. Because the employer is 
assessing the cost of extra female longevity to the woman alone, it 
is necessary to increase prices (and wages) only by an amount suffi-
cient to fund the benefits for an all male work force. The result is 
that the man pays for none of the cost of his retirement benefits, 
while the woman must pay for part of hers. Thus if the male em-
ployee's contribution to the plan is 10 cents per unit of production, 
the price of the product would be raised by an amount sufficient to 
increase each counterpart's wages by 10 cents. The man would bear 
none of the cost of his retirement benefit, but the 10 cents would 
not fully offset the woman's 10.14 cent contribution and she would 
pay part of the cost of her benefits. 
Again, from the standpoint of counterpart employees, funding the 
benefits out of profits is comparable to passing the cost on to cus-
tomers; only the source of the money is different. Men pay for none 
of their retirement benefits, and women are required to pay for part 
of theirs. 
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Identifying the intent behind and the effects of disparate treat-
ment of women leads to the conclusion that, although the practice 
of equal total benefits may succeed in protecting men against pay-
ing any subsidies to women, it is attended by the unexpected conse-
quence—revealed by the distinction between nominal and real con-
tributors to retirement plans—that men sometimes pay nothing for 
their benefits while women must pay for a substantial portion of 
theirs. The significance of this observation depends on two factors: 
(1) the identity of the bearers of the true incidence of the cost of 
retirement benefits, and (2) the intent underlying and the conse-
quences of the alternative practice of equal monthly benefits. Pro-
tecting men from subsidizing women is perhaps more pressing a 
need if employees generally bear most of the cost of benefits than if 
the cost is generally passed on to customers or taken out of profit.58 
Even if the cost tends to fall on employees, however, it is still impor-
tant to evaluate the practice of equal monthly benefits. Examina-
tion of this practice is the third step in an economic evaluation of 
the argument in favor of equal total benefits. 
M
 William A. Frey, a student at the New York State School of Industrial and Labor 
Relations a t Cornell University, has argued tha t the extra cost of women's extra benefits 
almost invariably will fall on men. See W. Frey, A Review of Michael Evan Gold's Economic 
Analysis in: Giving and Taking: Applications and Implications of City of Los Angeles v. 
Manhart (Spring 1979) (unpublished paper on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
Frey applies the distinction drawn in this article between the nominal and real contributors 
to a pension plan to two situations, one in which firms participate in competitive markets 
for both labor and products and the other in which a firm, while participating in a competitive 
labor market, enjoy9 a monopoly position in the market in which it sells its products. Frey 
maintains that in the first case employers themselves could not absorb the extra cost of 
women's extra benefits because, the market being competitive, any reduction in profit would 
drive them out of business. Likewise, the extra cost could not be passed on to customers 
because higher prices would result in sales being lost to competitors. Frey concludes that in 
the model of perfect competition, the extra cost of women's extra benefits would fall on the 
employees alone. Presumably, the monopolist is already selling his product at the highest 
price the market can bear and therefore cannot pass the extra cost on to customers. The 
monopolist has no reason to take the extra cost out of profits, for (assuming a competitive 
labor market) he will find an adequate supply of employees who will work for lower wages 
because of the value they place on pension contributions. Therefore, employees of monopolists 
will also bear the full cost of women's extra benefits. 
Mr. Frey's contribution to discussion of the issue is valuable, for it undertakes application 
of this article's theoretical constructs to more practical situations. Conclusions based on 
Frey's analysis, however, would be premature because additional important variables have 
not been taken into account. One such variable, as suggested by Professor Olivia Mitchell of 
the Labor Economics Department of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor 
Relations at Cornell University, is the elasticity of demand. If the product is gasoline, and 
customers will buy roughly the same amount at 85 cents per gallon as they did at 83 cents, 
much of the extra cost of women's extra benefits may well be passed on to the consuming 
public. 
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c. The Intent Behind and the Effects of Equal Monthly Benefits 
Plans that provide equal monthly benefits for counterparts, and 
charge them equal or no contributions, implicitly assume that the 
appropriate period for measuring equality of benefits is one month, 
not the total span of years during which benefits are received. Al-
though this practice might be expected to require men to subsidize 
benefits for women, distinguishing between nominal and real con-
tributors shows that men sometimes do subsidize women's benefits, 
but that at other times they do not. Moreover, in no event is one 
class, and not the other, required to pay for its own benefits. 
In noncontributory plans, if monthly benefits for counterparts are 
to be equal, more money must be contributed on behalf of the 
woman. The employer is the nominal source of the contribution, yet 
there are three possible real sources. If the cost of benefits is shifted 
back to employees, counterparts' wages are reduced equally.59 The 
man subsidizes the woman's benefits because each counterpart 
effectively makes an equal contribution to the plan, although the 
woman's benefits are 14% more costly than the man's. For example, 
if total compensation is $1 per employee per unit of production and 
the cost of funding retirement benefits averages 10 cents per unit for 
counterparts, wages would fall to 90 cents. Because the man's bene-
fits actually cost only 9.3 cents, he is subsidizing the woman by 
paying 10 cents for 9.3 cents worth of pension benefits.60 If the cost 
of benefits is passed on to customers, there is no need to reduce 
wages because increased prices generate the employer's contribu-
tion. Likewise, wages remain unchanged if the cost of benefits comes 
out of profits. In both of these cases, neither counterpart bears any 
of the cost of his retirement benefits because someone else, custom-
ers or employer, pays for it. Thus if the price of the product is 
increased by 10 cents per employee per unit of production, or if 
profit falls by that amount, employees' wages will be unaffected. 
Total compensation increases, with the woman's increasing more 
than the man's, but neither increase comes at the expense of the 
counterpart's compensation. 
In contributory plans, if contributions and monthly benefits are 
to be equal for counterparts, some of the money nominally 
" To comply with title VII and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), the reduction 
presumably must be equal. 
•* This discussion assumes that the work force is composed of 50% male and 50% female 
workers. 
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contributed by the man must be used to help pay for the woman's 
extra benefits. If the true cost of benefits falls on the employees, 
wages hold steady and contributions are subtracted from take-home 
pay. Because counterparts make equal contributions but the woman 
receives a greater total benefit, the man is subsidizing her. For 
example, if each contributed 10 cents, the man will eventually re-
ceive 9.3 cents worth of retirement benefits, while the woman will 
receive 10.7 cents. If the true cost of benefits is either passed on to 
customers or taken out of profit, counterparts' wages are increased 
by the size of their contributions and the contributions are then 
withheld from take-home pay. In neither case does a counterpart 
bear any of the cost of his retirement benefits. 
d. The Equities of Equal Monthly Benefits and Equal Total 
Benefits 
The final step in this economic evaluation is to ask whether equal 
total benefits or equal monthly benefits are more equitable. Neither 
approach is beyond criticism: equal monthly benefits mean that 
men sometimes subsidize women; equal total benefits mean that 
women sometimes pay for a portion of their benefits when men pay 
for none of theirs. Designation of the lesser evil ultimately may 
depend on empirical studies that measure the effects on employees. 
If most employers either pass the cost pf retirement benefits on to 
customers or take the cost out of profit, men would not be subsidiz-
ing women in an equal monthly benefits plan and there would be 
no justification for the practice of equal total benefits. Even if it 
were demonstrated, however, that the full incidence of retirement 
costs always falls on employees, and that therefore men always sub-
sidize women in an equal monthly benefits program—which would 
be the strongest case for the practice of equal total benefits—the 
burden that the subsidy places on men is much less than the burden 
women bear in paying the cost of their extra longevity. Equal 
monthly benefits spread the cost of extra female longevity through-
out the class of all male and female employees, while equal total 
benefits place the full cost of extra female longevity on women 
alone—as the following example illustrates. 
Assume an employer has no retirement plan and pays wages of 
$1 per employee per unit of production. The employer initiates a 
noncontributory defined benefit plan providing that counterparts 
aged seventy who have been covered by the plan for thirty years will 
receive equal monthly benefits of $1,000. If counterparts produce 
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eight units per hour, the cost of benefits (assuming a 5% interest 
factor) will be approximately 10 cents per unit. If the full cost is 
shifted back to employees, wages will fall to 90 cents. If the work 
force is half female, women's benefits will consume 53% of all contri-
butions, and a man would subsidize his female counterpart in the 
amount of $107 per annum." In contrast, if this same employer 
operates an otherwise identical plan but provides for equal total 
benefits for counterparts, there will be no subsidy: a man's monthly 
benefit will go up to $1,070, but his counterpart's monthly benefit 
will fall to $940.12 Thus equal total benefits—assessing the cost of 
extra female longevity to women alone—cost a woman more in one 
month of retirement than equal monthly benefits—that is, spread-
ing the cost of extra female longevity throughout the class of all 
employees—cost a man in one year of work. A given work force, of 
course, generally is not half female. Nationally, women represent 
approximately 40% of the total work force.63 The amount of money 
a man must pay to subsidize women's benefits obviously decreases 
as the percentage of women covered by his plan decreases. If the cost 
of extra female longevity is borne by women alone, however, the 
decrease in a woman's monthly benefit is the same no matter how 
many other women are covered by the same plan. The lesser of the 
evils seems clear. 
It has been seen that two periods of time can be used to measure 
equality of benefits in retirement plans: one month (resulting in 
equal monthly benefits) or the entire span of years during which 
benefits are received (resulting in equal total benefits). The forego-
ing discussion has been an evaluation of the argument in favor of 
equal total benefits. This argument, that each sex should pay for its 
own benefits and neither should subsidize the other, essentially 
11
 For example, funding a 70-year-old man's benefit of $1,000 per month requires $109,000. 
For his female counterpart, $124,000 is required. Thus for a 50% male work force, an equal 
monthly benefit plan would require an average contribution of $116,500 per employee. With 
a 5% compound interest rate, this sum can be accumulated over 30 years at $1,670 per year. 
Because a man's benefits alone could be funded by $1,562 per year, while a woman's benefits 
require $1,777 per year, men subsidize each of their counterparts $107 per year. The $1,670 
figure breaks down into $32 per week, or 80 cents per working hour, making the cost per unit 
approximately 10 cents. When an equal total benefits approach is used, men receive a higher 
monthly benefit for the identical $116,000 contribution because of the difference in longevity. 
Derived from INSTITUTE FOR BUSINESS PLANNING, supra note 34, at 366. 
•
2
 Of course, much of this difference is attributable to the impact of years of compounding 
interest. 
** See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 25 EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, 
No. 11, at 23, 24 (1978). 
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concerns economic equity, so that an economic evaluation of the 
argument appropriate. It was shown that the argument loses much 
of its force in light of the distinction between nominal and real 
contributors to retirement plans: men do not necessarily subsidize 
women in equal monthly benefits programs; and men sometimes do 
not pay at all for their benefits in equal total benefits programs, 
while women must pay for a significant portion of theirs. But vitiat-
ing the argument for one proposition does not create an argument 
for its alternative, and it is necessary to articulate a rationale in 
favor of equal monthly benefits for counterparts. Such a rationale 
can be constructed from the logic of the Manhart case. 
2. The Argument for Equal Monthly Benefits 
The choice between equal monthly and equal total benefits was 
not at issue in Manhart because the Department's plan provided for 
equal monthly benefits for counterparts. Nevertheless, the Depart-
ment consistently maintained that requiring equal employee contri-
butions to a plan that offered equal monthly benefits would be 
unfair because men would be forced to subsidize women.84 Although 
the Supreme Court did not rule on benefits, it did refute the subsidy 
argument in justifying its holding that contributions must be equal 
for male and female counterparts. The Court said that employees 
must be treated as individuals, not as members of groups. A woman 
may not be charged a higher rate of contribution because she is a 
woman, even if the class of women does tend to outlive the class of 
men. If as a result of this rule men have to subsidize women, as 
blacks already subsidize whites and single persons now subsidize 
married persons, that is a policy judgment that Congress has 
reached.65 
This reasoning, which the Court applied to the issue of contribu-
tions, bears with full force on the issue of benefits. An equal total 
benefits plan involves no serious pretense of equality for individuals. 
Rather, equality for groups is considered sufficient: the class of men 
receives the same total benefits, proportionate to its membership 
and pension credits, as the class of women. Under an equal total 
benefits plan, equality for individuals occurs only in the unusual 
case in which each counterpart happens to die on the average date 
of death for his sexual class. An advocate who tried to justify an 
u
 See Brief for Petitioner at 47, City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 
435 U.S. 702 (1978); Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water 
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
« See 435 U.S. at 708-11. 
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equal total benefits plan in light of Manhart's standard of individ-
ual treatment would have to assume that each individual possesses 
the relevant characteristic of his class (average longevity), but the 
assumption itself treats employees as members of groups rather 
than as individuals and therefore would defeat the argument. 
In contrast, individual equality exists in an equal monthly bene-
fits plan because each counterpart receives exactly the same 
monthly benefit. The class of women may receive proportionately 
more total benefits than the class of men, just as the class of whites 
will likely receive proportionately more benefits than the class of 
blacks, but the focus of the law is on individuals, not classes.66 
Choosing one month as the appropriate period of time for measuring 
equality of benefits eliminates the need to assume that individuals 
possess class characteristics. Each individual, whatever his racial 
and sexual characteristics, is treated exactly the same as his coun-
terpart during the relevant period of time. Only equal monthly ben-
efits can satisfy title VH's emphasis on individual treatment. 
Two arguments can be advanced against equal monthly benefits. 
According to the first argument, equal monthly benefits would re-
quire an employer to violate the Equal Pay Act.67 Because more 
money is needed to fund the woman's benefits, the employer is 
arguably giving the woman greater compensation than her counter-
part. In a defined benefit plan, the employer might expressly con-
tribute more on behalf of the woman or, if he contributes equally 
on behalf of counterparts, some of the money contributed as consid-
eration for the man's work would in reality be used to fund the 
woman's benefits. In a defined contribution plan, the woman's ac-
count would actually be larger than the man's. This argument, how-
ever, is nothing more than a restatement of the discredited proposi-
tion that men should not subsidize women's benefits. Moreover, the 
argument is plainly wrong if the true cost of benefits is borne by 
employees in the form of lower wages because, in this event, the 
employer really is not paying for pensions. 
The argument ostensibly is valid if the funds for benefits come out 
of profits, but it still is erroneous because it assumes that an em-
ployer's contributions to a retirement plan are a form of wages cov-
ered by the Equal Pay Act. In fact, there is an important distinction 
M
 In such event, the benefits differential is based on actual longevity, rather than on 
gender, and is not proscribed by the Equal Pay Act. See id. at 710 n.20. 
" 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). 
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between wages and employer contributions. An employee who per-
forms forty hours of satisfactory work has an absolute right to his 
wages. He can do with the money as he likes and, if he dies before 
actually receiving it, his estate is entitled to it. In contrast, an 
employee, who performs forty hours of satisfactory work, as the re-
sult of which his employer contributes money to a retirement plan, 
has only a limited and contingent right to benefit from the contribu-
tion. He has no right to control the contribution before he retires 
and, if he dies before retiring, his estate has no right to receive even 
a fully vested pension.** A comparison between wages and retire-
ment benefits is more appropriate. A retiree who lives for a period 
of time is entitled to receive his pension, just as an employee who 
performs satisfactory work for a period of time is entitled to receive 
wages. An employee can spend his wages as he likes; a retiree can 
dispose of his pension as he pleases. An employee's estate is entitled 
to the employee's wages if he dies before receiving them. Similarly, 
a retiree's estate would be entitled to a benefit that covered a period 
of time when the retiree was alive but was delayed in payment until 
after the retiree died. If the Equal Pay Act is concerned not with 
the employer's contributions, but with the retiree's benefits, a re-
tirement plan must offer equal monthly benefits to male and female 
counterparts.8* 
A second argument against equal monthly benefits asserts that 
such benefits would violate title VII by having a disparate impact 
on men, who would receive proportionately less in benefits than 
women. In Manhart the Supreme Court expressly dealt with this 
argument and, in doing so, lent support to the argument that the 
Equal Pay Act is concerned with monthly benefits, rather than 
employer contributions: 
A variation on the Department's fairness theme is the suggestion 
** Pooling of risks is unrelated to vesting of rights. A vested right cannot be forfeited by, 
for example, an employee's changing jobs. An employee may have a vested right to an annuity 
in a plan that pools the risks of longevity, or he may have a vested right to a lump-sum 
distribution in a plan that does not pool the risks of longevity. For a discussion of vesting 
and its advantages, see J.'MELONE & E. ALLEN, supra note 31, at 54-57. 
* The Wage and Hour Administrator, who is responsible for enforcing the Equal Pay Act, 
formerly approved fringe benefit plans that either provided equal benefits to counterparts 
(regardless of the cost to the employer), or provided disparate benefits (so long as the cost to 
the employer was the same for counterparts). 29 C.P.R. § 800.116(d) (1978). It has been 
proposed, however, that this construction be withdrawn. The Administrator has proposed for 
comment an interpretation of the Equal Pay Act making clear that benefits are "wages" 
within the meaning of the Act, The effect would be to permit only plans which pay equal 
monthly benefits to counterparts. 43 Fed. Reg. 38,029 (1978). 
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that a gender-neutral pension plan would itself violate Title Vll 
because of its disproportionately heavy impact on male employees. 
This suggestion has no force in the sex discrimination context 
because each retiree's total pension benefits are determined by his 
actual life span; any differential in benefits paid to men and women 
in the aggregate is thus "based on [al factor other than sex," and 
consequently immune from challenge under the Equal Pay Act. 
. . , Even under Title VII itself—assuming disparate impact anal-
ysis applies to fringe benefits—the male employees would not 
prevail. Even a completely neutral practice will inevitably have 
some disproportionate impact on one group or another. Griggs does 
not imply, and this Court has never held, that discrimination must 
always be inferred from such consequences.70 
Read with the Court's indication that it is not unfair to group men 
with women in an insurance scheme,71 this language makes it rea-
sonably clear that the Court will not countenance any objection to 
equal monthly benefits for counterparts.72 
If the courts hold that title VII entitles a woman to the same 
monthly benefits as her male counterpart, interesting questions of 
remedy will arise. Three classes of employees would be affected: 
women who retired before the effective date of title VII and are 
presently receiving lower monthly benefits than their male counter-
parts; women who retired after the effective date of title VII and are 
receiving lower monthly benefits than their counterparts; and 
women who either retired after the announcement of Manhart or 
have not yet retired. Although distinctions may be drawn among 
these classes, the controlling fact is that Manhart awarded only 
prospective relief. The Court denied restitution of the amount by 
™ 435 U.S. at 710 n.20. 
n
 See id. at 710. 
72
 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is responsible for administra-
tive interpretation of title VTt, has ruled that a retirement plan may not differentiate benefits 
on the basis of gender, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(f) (1978), and that it is immaterial that the cost of 
the benefits is greater for one sex than for the other, id. § 1604.9(e). In a specific decision, 
the Commission found unlawful discrimination in a plan that paid a woman a lower monthly 
benefit than her male counterpart. EEOC Decision No. 73-118 (cited in Decision No. 75-147, 
(1975) EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) H 6447). 
The First Circuit, albeit reluctantly, has endorsed this conclusion. In EEOC v. Colby 
College, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978), reo'g 439 F. Supp. 631 (D. Me. 1977), the appellate 
court held that Manhart required reversal of a district court judgment that had upheld an 
employer's practice of requiring equal contributions of counterparts while paving women 
lower monthly benefits in a joint contribution defined contribution plan. 
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which a woman's contribution exceeded her male counterpart's, 
even though title VII was in effect when the excess contribution was 
extracted.73 The Court's concern about the solvency of retirement 
plans accounted in substantial part for the denial of monetary re-
lief.7' 
The possibility of increasing retirement benefits earned by pre-
Manhart service raises even greater concern about the financial sta-
bility of retirement plans: raising retirement benefits would cost 
much more than refunding excess contributions. Assume, for exam-
ple, that a man contributed $1 per year and his female counterpart 
contributed $1.15. If five years elapsed between the date two years 
preceding the filing of a title VII charge75 and the date of final 
judgment, the plan would have to refund only 75 cents to the 
woman. In comparison, assume the benefit for a man is $1 per year 
and for his counterpart, 74 cents. Ignoring interest, this would yield 
them equal total amounts if he survived fourteen years and she 
survived nineteen years. The cost of raising the woman's monthly 
benefit to the level of the man's would be 24 cents for each year she 
draws benefits. If the average retiree had lived out half of her life 
expectancy, the average cost of raising benefits would be $2.28 per 
woman. Most retirement plans could easily use present contribu-
tions to fund this new liability, and thus the solvency of few plans 
would be jeopardized. Nevertheless, the denial of monetary relief 
seems just because the money awarded would not be available to 
fund pension credits for presently working employees. The burden 
of monetary relief most likely would fall not on the employers who 
caused the discrimination, nor on the men who benefited from it, 
but on younger employees who neither caused the discrimination 
nor benefited from it. Of course, all service rendered after Manhart 
must generate equal retirement benefits for counterparts. A woman 
who retires five years after Manhart with twenty-five years of service 
will have four-fifths of her benefit calculated according to the old, 
discriminatory formula, and one-fifth of her benefit calculated ac-
cording to a nondiscriminatory formula.76 
73
 See 435 U.S. at 720. 
74
 See id. at 721. 
» See title VJJ § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976). 
78
 The Third Circuit has reached this result in cases with analogous issues regarding rem-
edy. See Stuppiello v. ITT Avionics Div., 575 F.2d 430 (3d Cir. 1978); Rosen v. Public Serv. 
Elec. & Gas Co., 11 FEP Cases 330 (D.N.J.), aff'd mem., 527 F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976). 
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C. Options 
Few retirement plans offer only straight annuities. Most offer the 
retiree a number of options, including early retirement, joint and 
survivor annuities, and stock options. Some plans also allow em-
ployees to contribute additional sums beyond the required contribu-
tions. Manhart's effect on these options will now be addressed. 
1, Early Retirement Options 
Many retirement plans allow an employee to retire before the 
normal retirement date, for example at age fifty-five or sixty instead 
of sixty-five or seventy. A defined contribution plan simply allocates 
the balance in the account of an early retiree over his life expect-
ancy, as it would if he retired at the normal retirement age. Defined 
benefit plans customarily calculate the monthly benefit that the 
early retiree's hypothetical analogue (having the same sex, years of 
service, final average salary, contributions on deposit, etc.) would 
receive if the analogue retired at the normal retirement age; this 
sum is then discounted to allow for the actual age of the retiree.77 
Because greater longevity characterizes women aged sixty as well as 
women aged seventy, many plans discount a woman's early retire-
ment benefit more78 than they discount her male counterpart's ben-
efit.79 Obviously, this practice must be discontinued after Manhart 
77
 Assume M decides to retire at age 60 after 25 years of service. His salary during his final 
year of work was {1,800 per month. According to the plan, ATs hypothetical analogue (that 
is, a male employee who retires at the normal retirement age of 70 with a final salary of $1,800 
per month) would receive $1,000 per month in benefits. The amount of money needed to fund 
the analogue's benefits is approximately $109,000. M is entitled to whatever level of benefits 
can be provided over his longer life expectancy by $109,000, or approximately $752 per month. 
In a sense, early retirement in a defined benefit plan converts the plan into a defined contribu-
tion plan, and the employee's account contains the sum of money that would have been set 
aside by the defined benefit plan to fund the benefits of the early retiree's hypothetical 
analogue. 
n
 Not all plans discount early retirement more for women than for men. In Manhart the 
Department had in the past discounted a woman's early retirement benefit less than her male 
counterpart's. This costly feature, along with other discriminatory provisions of the plan (for 
example, women were required to retire at age 62, while men could work to age 65), affected 
contribution rates significantly. At times between 1938 and 1970, women were required to 
contribute as much as 45% more than their counterparts. Plaintiffs' (Original) Complaint at 
6-7, No. 73-2272-HP, C D . Cal., dated Sept. 26, 1973. 
" Assume F is Afs 60-year-old female counterpart. If her hypothetical analogue retired at 
age 70, many plans would pay her a lower monthly benefit than they would pay M's analogue 
because Fs analogue has a greater life expectancy. The amount of money needed to fund 
benefits for ATs analogue is $109,000. Presumably this same amount would be available to 
fund benefits for Fs analogue over her life expectancy (equalling approximately $880 per 
1979] Implications of Manhart 693 
Assumptions about longevity that are based solely on sex are as 
improper when the persons are aged fifty-five as when they are aged 
sixty-five. If male and female counterparts are entitled to equal 
monthly benefits when they begin to draw benefits at the normal 
retirement age, they clearly are entitled to equal monthly benefits 
if they retire early. 
2. Joint and Survivor Annuities 
Section 20580 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
197481 (ERISA) requires most plans covered by the Act to offer a 
retiree a choice between a "straight annuity," in which benefits are 
guaranteed for the length of his life, and a "joint and survivor" 
annuity (sometimes called a "co-annuity"), in which benefits are 
guaranteed for the length of both his life and his spouse's. Many 
plans that ERISA does not cover also offer joint and survivor annui-
ties.82 Assuming that Manhart has answered the question of how to 
calculate the employee's benefits, the problem of how to calculate 
the spouse's benefits remains. The present practice typically sets 
the joint and survivor rate in relation to the age and sex of the retiree 
and his spouse, raising the issue whether this is sex discrimination 
under title VII. 
A threshold issue is the applicability of title VII to joint and 
survivor annuities because title VE applies only to employees 
and the spouse of the retiree is not an employee.83 Each employee 
is entitled, however, to as much protection for his spouse as any 
other employee, regardless of the employee's sex. The protection 
afforded by a retirement plan is closely analogous to the protection 
afforded by the social security system. In Weinberger v. 
month) and to fund benefits over the longer life expectancy o f f herself. F's monthly benefit 
would be approximately $679. 
M
 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1976). 
81
 Id. §§ 1001-1381. 
82
 These options are often actuarial equivalents. The cost to the plan will be the same 
regardless of which option is elected. See H. BIEGEL, G. BUCK, D. FARWELL, A. FEFFERMAN, 
W. FELLERS, W. HARMAN, F. RUDGE, J. ST. JOHN & E. Wnxis, PENSIONS AND PROFIT SHARING 
101 (3d ed. 1964). Thus, the Court's comment that male employees who elect joint and 
survivor annuities may regain some of the advantage they will lose by virtue of the judgment 
in the case, see 435 U.S. at 709 n.14, is less than universally true. 
** The spouse of an employee of a public employer may be able to avoid this obstacle 
because of the equal protection requirements of the fifth or fourteenth amendments. The 
Constitution may prohibit disparate treatment of counterpart beneficiaries of a retirement 
plan: the government is taking action regarding them, and it is immaterial that they are not 
employees. 
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Wiesenfeld,u the Supreme Court held that a widower with a depen-
dent child was entitled to the same spousal benefits under the Social 
Security Act85 as a widow in his position would have received. Al-
though quite possibly "men are more likely than women to be the 
primary supporters of their spouses and children,"86 meaning that 
widowers will need spousal benefits less frequently than will wid-
ows, "such a gender-based generalization cannot suffice to justify 
the denigration of the efforts of women who do work and whose 
earnings contribute significantly to their families' support."87 Like-
wise, in Califano v. Goldfarb88 the Court held that a widower was 
entitled to survivor's benefits from the Old-Age, Survivors, and Dis-
ability Insurance Benefits program89 on the same basis as a widow. 
Affirming the three-judge district court, the Court quoted the fol-
lowing language from the lower court opinion: 
Mrs. Goldfarb was entitled to the dignity of knowing that her social 
security tax would contribute to [her and her husband's] joint 
welfare when the couple or one of them retired and her husband's 
welfare should she predecease him. She paid taxes at the same rate 
as men and there is not the slightest scintilla of support for the 
proposition that working women are less concerned about their 
spouses' welfare in old age than are men.90 
Although in both of these cases the right of the nonworker to receive 
benefits was at issue, the Court focused on the right of the worker 
to be free of sex discrimination. There is no reason to believe that 
the Court will not view the rights of non worker co-annuitants in the 
same light. Indeed, a stronger argument can be made for nondis-
criminatory treatment of annuitants than for similar treatment of 
social security beneficiaries because the employee co-annuitant, far 
from being dead, is also a recipient of benefits. 
Assuming that title VII protection applies to joint and survivor 
annuities, the question becomes whether setting a co-annuity rate 
by reference only to the age and sex of the employee and his spouse 
constitutes sex discrimination. Although here the discrimination 
is against men, who receive lower benefits than their female 
** 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
« 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1976). 
" 420 U.S. at 645. 
"Id. 
« 430 U.S. 199, 216-17 (1977). 
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-432 (1976). 
M
 430 U.S. at 204 (citation omitted). 
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counterparts,81 the rationale of Manhart would seem to control. As 
the Court wrote: 
An employment practice that requires 2,000 individuals to con-
tribute more money into a fund than 10,000 other employees simply 
because each of [the 2,000] is a woman, rather than a man, is in 
direct conflict with both the language and the policy of the Act. 
Such a practice does not pass the simple test of whether the evi-
dence shows "treatment of a person in a manner which but for that 
person's sex would be different."82 
In the straight annuity situation, the benefit of a female employee 
is reduced because she is a woman; in the joint and survivor annuity 
situation, the benefit of a male employee is reduced because he is a 
man and his spouse is a woman. 
This disparate treatment arguably is the result not of the em-
ployee's sex, but of his spouse's sex. Three responses seem persua-
sive. First, counterparts are entitled—regardless of sex—to equal 
protection for themselves and their spouses.83 Second, taking into 
account the sex of an employee's spouse inevitably takes into ac-
count the sex of the employee because spouses are of opposite 
sexes.94 If it is unlawful to vary counterparts' benefits because of 
their sexes, expanding the variables to include the sexes of the coun-
terparts' spouses does not legitimate the practice. Third, a greater 
reduction in the benefit of a male retiree who elects a joint and 
survivor annuity than in the benefit of his female counterpart allo-
cates the cost of his spouse's share of the benefit solely to the class 
of his sex. Manhart may be read to hold, however, that the risks of 
male and female longevity should be spread over the class of all 
employees. Placing the cost of the joint and survivor annuity on the 
11
 Consider an employee who is entitled to a straight annuity of $1,000 per month. Assume 
the plan offers and the employee selects the popular "50% joint and survivor annuity," in 
which payments to a spouse who survives the employee are one-half of the initial installment 
payments. Under present practices, if the employee is male and he and his wife are aged 65, 
the initial benefit will be $870; if the employee is female and she and her husband are aged 
65, the initial benefit will be $940. The female employee's annuity is reduced by a smaller 
amount than the male employee's because male spouses as a class have a relatively shorter 
life expectancy. See Brief for the Society of Actuaries and the American Academy of Actuaries 
as amici curiae at 14, City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 
(1978). 
» 435 U.S. at 711 (footnote omitted). 
K
 See text accompanying note 88 supra. 
** Cf. Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956 (5th Cir.) {finding violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
where a state-supported facility refused to hire a white man because his wife was black), cert. 
denied, 422 U.S. 1006 (1975). 
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class of all employees would be more in keeping with Manhart. 
A problem of adverse selection arises in the context of co-
annuities. If joint and survivor annuity rates were set by reference 
to the age—but not the sex—of the employee and his spouse, initial 
benefit payments would be higher for male employees and lower for 
female employees than they are presently. A male employee might 
choose the joint and survivor annuity, but a female employee would 
do better with some other option, if available, such as a lump-sum 
settlement with which she could buy a co-annuity from a private 
insurance company at a more favorable rate. Adverse selection of 
this type will not cause a serious problem, however, because the 
income tax consequences of receiving such a large amount of taxable 
income in a single year will make the lump-sum settlement an infre-
quent occurrence.85 If adverse selection does occur often, actuaries 
will be able to predict its incidence and adjust their planning ac-
cordingly. Because adverse selection occurs at retirement, when the 
employee's benefits ought to be fully funded, the soundness of the 
retirement plan should not be jeopardized. 
3. Optional Plans, Optional Contributions, Stock Options, and 
Profit Sharing 
Not all retirement plans require employees to participate, and not 
all plans require male and female counterparts to participate at the 
same level. Some plans are completely optional, allowing each em-
ployee to decide for himself whether or not to join. Optional plans 
also may allow the employee to determine his level of participation, 
that is, how much he will contribute. Some mandatory plans, in 
which employees are required to participate, allow an individual to 
make extra contributions.** Some plans substitute stock in a corpo-
ration for cash contributions or benefits. Manhart affects all of these 
plans. 
An employer may choose to offer his employees the opportunity 
to participate in a retirement plan at their election. Because mem-
bership is not compulsory, an argument can be made that an em-
ployee's participation is analogous to his purchasing an annuity 
from a private insurance company, which apparently may 
distinguish between male and female counterparts."7 Is it sex 
M
 See I.R.C. § 408(d)(1). 
-
M
 See J. MELONS & E. ALLEN, supra note 31, at 58-60. 
" Title VII applies to employers, but not to sellers of insurance. The Court stated, 
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discrimination for an employer to offer his employees the opportun-
ity to join a retirement plan that accepts only disparate contribu-
tions from male and female counterparts or that pays them dispar-
ate benefits? This article asserts that such plans are discriminatory 
because title VII requires an employer to provide male and female 
counterparts with "employment opportunities irrespective of their 
sex."*8 An employer need not offer a retirement plan but, if he does, 
the plan must not discriminate against women because of their sex. 
This is true even if membership in the plan is optional, because 
membership is a valuable opportunity: it protects against the risk 
of providing for the risk of longevity by automatic accumulation for 
individuals who have difficulty saving money from their take-home 
pay and by expert investment of savings, and it may provide valua-
ble tax advantages.*9 An employer should not be allowed to rely on 
the voluntary nature of his plan as a defense against a claim of 
discrimination any more than he can (1) defend against discrimina-
tion in hiring by arguing that women who do not like the discrimina-
tion need not work for him,100 or (2) defend against discrimination 
in seniority rights following pregnancy leave by arguing that women 
may avoid the discrimination by refraining from becoming preg-
nant.101 
Alternatively, an employer may require his employees to partici-
pate in a retirement plan, but allow them to contribute extra 
amounts toward their pensions. Again, it may be argued that an 
employee's extra contributions are analogous to his purchasing a 
private annuity and that therefore it is lawful for the plan to allow 
a man's extra contribution to purchase a higher monthly benefit 
than a like contribution by his female counterpart. If, as argued 
above, totally optional plans are prohibited from discriminating 
against women, it follows that partially optional plans are likewise 
"[ajlthough we conclude that the Department's practice violated Title VII, we do not sug-
gest that the statute was intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension industries. All 
that is at issue today is a requirement that men and women make unequal contributions to 
an employer-operated pension fund." 435 U.S. at 717. 
M
 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542,544 (1971). Although this case dealt with 
discriminatory hiring, the statute clearly mandates equal opportunities for employees as well 
as for applicants. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976). 
** If retirement contributions exceed $1,500 in one year, they still may remain tax-
deductible. In contrast, any amount over $1,500 deposited into an Individual Retirement 
Account (IRA) would be taxable. See I.R.C. § 408(a)(1). 
m
 See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971). 
1,1
 See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 140 n.2 (1977). 
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prohibited. Indeed, a stronger argument can be made regarding 
partially optional plans because while the employee who elects 
not to join a totally optional plan may establish an Individual 
Retirement Account (IRA), the employee who is covered by a man-
datory plan may not.102 The employer who maintains a partially 
optional plan denies employees the alternative of an IRA and there-
fore should not be allowed to substitute for it an option that discrim-
inates against women. In contrast, a plan that allows each employee 
to determine his own level of contribution—so that a man might 
eventually enjoy a higher monthly benefit than a woman who is 
otherwise his counterpart because he taxed himself higher contribu-
tions—is unobjectionable so long as one dollar of a man's contribu-
tion buys him the same monthly benefit as his counterpart's dollar. 
Instead of maintaining a retirement fund, a corporate employer 
may permit its employees to purchase stock that, if held until the 
employee retires, substitutes for a pension. Alternatively, a corpora-
tion may allow its employees to purchase stock options that mature 
when the employee retires. Because male and female counterparts 
have equal opportunities to purchase the stock or options, such 
programs resemble defined contribution plans that provide lower 
periodic benefits for women than for men. The woman who wishes 
to parcel out her principal and income over her life expectancy will 
realize a lower periodic benefit than her male counterpart who in-
vests the same amount in stocks or options. The Court's dictum in 
Manhart authorizing severance pay plans appears to protect such 
plans.103 The employee becomes the owner of the stock on the date 
of his retirement; he occupies the same position as an employee 
whose company maintains a severance pay plan that provides a 
lump-sum benefit at retirement. Because male and female counter-
parts receive exactly the same amount of property in cash or stock 
when they retire, there is no disparate treatment. A disparate im-
pact argument could be made, asserting that such facially neutral 
programs would disadvantage women because they would have to 
elect lower monthly benefits in order to provide for their full life 
expectancies, but the Court's response to the Department's argu-
ment that equal periodic benefits would be unfair to men provides 
an appropriate reply.104 If a gender-neutral plan with some 
1K
 See I.R.C. § 219(b)(2). 
'» See 435 U.S. at 717-18. 
m
 See id. at 710 n.20; text accompanying note 70 supra. 
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disproportionate impact on men is legal, a plan with a dispropor-
tionate impact on women is also valid, and title VII is apparently 
satisfied. Differences in the way counterpart retirees spend their 
lump-sum distributions, and in what they receive in return, arise 
from a factor other than sex—these are free choices made by the 
individuals involved and the companies with which they chose to 
deal. 
The same reasoning applies to profit-sharing plans. Assuming 
that male and female counterparts are allocated equal portions of 
profit, the relevant inquiry is whether the plan pools the risk of 
longevity or distributes an employee's benefits in a lump sum at 
retirement. In the former situation, monthly benefits must be equal 
for counterparts; in the latter, the one-time settlement must be 
equal. It is immaterial that the contribution is contingent on the 
firm's profits. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
Whatever Congress and the Supreme Court may say about equal-
ity for women, two facts will remain: women outlive men and em-
ployers are aware of the longevity figures.105 If the applications of 
Manhart discussed above are correct, an employer who maintains a 
defined benefit or defined contribution plan ("insurance plans , ,m) 
will be required to provide equal monthly benefits to counterparts 
at equal cost to them, and it is inevitable that the employer will 
realize that women are more costly employees than men. The Court, 
however, has expressly authorized an employer to maintain a sever-
ance pay plan into which he makes equal contributions for each 
employee, leaving a retiree who wishes to insure against the risk of 
longevity to "purchase the largest benefit which his or her accumu-
lated contributions could command in the open market."107 An 
m
 Changing life-styles may narrow the gap between male and female longevity, but no 
significant narrowing can be expected for persons who retire within the next two decades. 
These persons are unlikely to change their lives drastically and, even if they do, the changes 
probably would have only a marginal effect on longevity because they occurred so late in life. 
"* So called here because they pool the risk of longevity for a large class of persons. 
IW
 435 U.S. at 717-18. The idea may derive from General Electric Co. v. Gilbert: 
Absent proof of different values, the cost to "insure" against the risks is, in essence, 
nothing more than extra compensation to the employees, in the form of fringe benefits. 
If the employer were to remove the insurance fringe benefits and, instead, increase 
wages by an amount equal to the cost of the "insurance," there would clearly be no 
gender-based discrimination, even though a female employee who wished to purchase 
disability insurance that covered all risks would have to pay more than would a male 
employee who purchased identical disability insurance, due to the fact that her 
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employer who has a severance pay or similar plan ("noninsurance 
plans"108) will be obligated only to put equal amounts of money into 
counterparts' accounts, and the woman will be no more expensive 
to employ than the man. Women will realize that they can earn 
greater compensation by working for an employer who has an insur-
ance plan, provided significant numbers of men are covered by the 
same plan. Men will learn that if their employer maintains an insur-
ance plan, their total compensation is inversely related to the pro-
portion of women who work for their employer. If the economic 
forces generated by these forces develop fully in a competitive mar-
ket, the result will be threefold: (1) men will tend not to work for 
employers who maintain insurance plans, resulting in segregation of 
the sexes in part of the labor market; (2) employers who maintain 
noninsurance plans will enjoy a competitive advantage in attracting 
well-qualified male employees; and (3) employers who maintain 
insurance plans will be tempted to discriminate against women by 
paying them less than their true marginal revenue product or by not 
hiring them at all.1* Consider the following model, drawn in a com-
petitive market for products and labor. 
Employers Plan and Sevplan are in the same business and, except 
as specified, are identical in all respects. Each has equal numbers 
insurance had to cover the "extra" disabilities due to pregnancy. 
429 U.S. 125, 139 n.17. Except for Justice Brennan, who did not participate in Manhart and 
who dissented in Gilbert, all present members of the Court joined in either this aspect of 
Gilbert or the quotation in the text. 
"* The term "noninsurance plans" is used herein because they do not pool the risk of 
longevity; each individual's account is separate. 
m
 One important element has been omitted from the employee's calculation: his percep-
tion of his own longevity. If an employee can be expected to maximize his income by examin-
ing the effects of specific features of retirement plans on his lifetime compensation, he can 
be expected to take into account how long he thinks he will live. For this purpose, employees 
can be divided into three groups. The first is composed of those who foresee long lives for 
themselves; they will prefer employers who offer insurance plans. The second group is com-
posed of those who expect to die at a young age; they will prefer employers who pay compensa-
tion in the form of wages, and perhaps life insurance. The third group is composed of those 
who have no opinion on their lifespans or who expect to live an average length of time; they 
are likely to base their choice of employers on economic considerations. The size of the first 
two groups will diminish the importance of the elements discussed in the text as the causes 
of the effects predicted. The existence of those groups, however, will actually make the effects 
even more likely because it is probable that the number of employees who foresee long lives 
for themselves will be disproportionately female (women generally outlive men, and fewer 
women smoke, hang glide, etc.), while the number of employees who foresee short lives for 
themselves will be disproportionately male. Thus men will have two reasons to avoid employ-
ers who offer insurance plans: a man may not live long enough to benefit from such a plan 
and, even if he does, he may get more total compensation from an employer who offers a 
noninsurance plan or no plan at all. 
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of male and female employees, and each can attract qualified work-
ers, turn out a good product, and earn a satisfactory profit by com-
pensating employees at an average rate of $1 per unit of production. 
Both maintain retirement programs. Competitive pressure prevents 
them from passing on to customers the cost of funding the program 
and, like most businessmen, they are unwilling to take this cost out 
of profit.110 As a result, the true incidence of the cost of benefits falls 
on the employees. Employer Sevplan has instituted a severance pay 
plan, as permitted by Manhart, into which he deposits 10% of each 
employee's wages,111 making average take-home pay 90 cents.112 
Employer Plan has a noncontributory defined benefit retirement 
plan that provides equal monthly benefits for male and female 
counterparts. To keep his employees' take-home pay competitive 
with his rival's, Employer Plan contributes to his plan an average 
of 10 cents per employee per unit of production. 
Because financing women's benefits costs approximately 14% 
more than financing men's benefits, 53% of every dollar Employer 
Plan puts into the retirement plan goes toward women's benefits 
and 47% goes toward men's benefits. A typical female employee of 
Employer Plan earns 100.7 cents per unit of production {90 cents 
wages plus 10.7 cents retirement benefits), while a male employee 
earns 99.3 cents per unit of production (90 cents wages plus 9.3 cents 
retirement benefits). This difference is significant over time: pro-
ducing eight units per hour, a woman would earn $16,112 in one year 
(2,000 hours), while her male counterpart would earn only $15,888. 
Although their take-home pay in any given year is the same, the 
value of the woman's retirement account increases by $224 more 
than the man's in that year. In contrast, a male employee of Em-
ployer Sevplan does not subsidize the benefits of his counterpart. 
He gets the full value of the 10 cents contributed to the severance 
"• In a truly competitive industry there would be no "profits" in an economic sense with 
which to fund the benefits. The full measure of the "accounting" profits present would be 
necessary to meet the opportunity cost of the capital invested. 
111
 The model would not be materially changed if Employer Sevplan had no retirement 
program at all. His cost of employing a woman would still be the same as the cost of employ-
ing a man, and each employee would receive the full value, but nothing more, of his compen-
sation. 
"* Other factors affecting the total compensation package are ignored in this illustration 
because they cost employers equal amounts for counterparts. (An exception is health and 
disability insurance. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)). Male employees 
can be expected to behave toward employers with and without health and disability insurance 
programs in the same manner as they will behave toward employers with and without retire-
ment plans operated on insurance principles. 
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pay plan, making his annual compensation $16,000. His take-home 
pay is the same as that of the man who works for Employer Plan, 
but his retirement account increases by $112 a year more. Therefore, 
at the margin men will prefer to work for Employer Sevplan."3 
Moreover, so long as there are enough men working for Employer 
Plan to contribute a significant subsidy to women's benefits, women 
will prefer to work for Employer Plan. 
Because whether he hires men or women makes no economic dif-
ference to Employer Sevplan, the increased supply of male appli-
cants will change the sexual composition of his work force: he will 
employ more men and fewer women. Women will constitute a larger 
percentage of Employer Plan's applicant pool because they can earn 
more money working for him. As these forces develop, males will 
move from Employer Plan to Employer Sevplan in increasing num-
bers because, for each new woman Employer Plan hires, the com-
pensation of the remaining men will decrease—they must subsidize 
a greater number of women.114 This process will not affect Employer 
Sevplan's retirement program, which is indifferent to sex, but Em-
ployer Plan's program, which is operated on insurance principles, 
will have to change to take account of the increasingly female com-
position of its membership. Because women's benefits cost more 
than men's, Employer Plan will have to choose Tbetween (1) holding 
wages and benefits constant by increasing the level of his contribu-
tion (he can no longer count on a subsidy from male employees), and 
(2) holding his contribution constant by decreasing the level of 
wages or benefits. This choice is only theoretical because, to remain 
competitive and to earn a satisfactory profit, Employer Plan must 
maintain a marginal labor cost no greater than Employer Sevplan's. 
Wages or benefits must fall. If wages remain at 90 cents, pensions 
will approach the level that 10 cents per employee per unit could 
purchase for a woman. Ultimately, a female employee of Employer 
Plan would receive the same monthly benefit from her employer's 
program as a female employee of Employer Sevplan would receive 
m
 Increasing the supply of men to Employer Sevplan will tend to depress the price of men's 
labor but, so long as Employer Sevplan's compensation exceeds the sum of Employer Plan's 
compensation plus the cost of changing jobs, men will move from Plan to. Sevplan. 
114
 When Employer Plan's work force was 50% male, each employee earned $1,664 annually 
toward retirement. For this $1,664 women would receive $1,780 in benefits, while men would 
receive only $1,548 in benefits. If his work force became 25% male and current benefit levels 
applied, each employee would have to earn $1,722 annually toward retirement. The increase 
presumably would be funded through a decrease in take-home pay. Men still would receive 
only $1,548 in benefits, representing a significant decrease in compensation. 
1979] Implications of Manhart 703 
if she purchased an annuity from a private insurance company, and 
a male employee of Employer Sevplan would receive a higher 
monthly benefit from his insurance company. The rule of equal 
contributions and equal monthly benefits would become meaning-
less. 
This analysis shows that pressure from the supply side of the 
labor market will tend to produce retirement plans that pay women 
monthly benefits lower than their male counterparts. This pressure 
will be accompanied by a tendency toward the segregation of male 
and female workers according to the nature of employers' retirement 
programs. Consideration of the demand side of the labor market 
reveals pressure in a similar direction, and this pressure unfortun-
ately creates an economic motive for employers to violate the law 
of equal employment opportunity. 
Employer Sevplan may be economically indifferent as between 
male and female employees because they are equally costly to him, 
but Employer Plan knows that because he uses a noncontributory 
insurance plan he must contribute more on behalf of women at a 
given level of benefits. To the extent that an employer bears the true 
cost of retirement benefits by taking it out of profit, or passes it on 
to customers by raising prices, he can save money and increase 
profits by substituting men for women. To illustrate with extremes, 
if a given level of benefits requires a contribution of 9.3 cents per 
employee per unit of production for an all-male work force, the same 
level of benefits for an all-female work force would require a contri-
bution of 10.7 cents. Each time a man is substituted for a woman, 
the employer who bears the true incidence of the cost of retirement 
benefits increases his profit by 1.4 cents per employee per unit of 
production, and the employer who passes this savings on to custom-
ers can lower his prices and undersell his competitors by a like 
amount. 
Employer Plan is losing male employees and gaining female em-
ployees. All other things being equal, he must contribute more to 
fund a woman's benefits than to fund a man's. In the short run, 
other things are not equal. The newly hired women probably will be 
younger than the men they replace. They will be paid at a lower 
rate, and they are less likely to remain on the job long enough to 
earn a vested pension. Each of these factors reduces the liability 
that an employee represents to a retirement plan and, accordingly, 
reduces the obligation of an employer to make contributions. Thus 
the replacement of men with women may not immediately increase 
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Employer Plan's level of contribution, but eventually he will feel 
the burden of a predominantly female work force. If he be-
lieves115—albeit mistakenly in a competitive market—that he bears 
or is passing on to customers any part of the cost of retirement 
benefits, he inevitably will be tempted to substitute men for women. 
Even if he is aware that he is shifting the full cost of benefits back 
to employees, he still can reduce his short-term obligation to con-
tribute to the plan by substituting men for women. Theoretically, 
this substitution will allow him to increase wages by the amount he 
is saving on contributions, and in time competitive forces will prob-
ably cause him to do this. Employer Plan will realize, however, an 
immediate saving because pension contributions are adjusted as 
quickly as turnover occurs, while wage adjustments occur infre-
quently. For example, suppose Employer Plan employs 1,200 
women and 800 men when he begins to feel pressured by increased 
retirement contributions. If each employee produces eight units an 
hour, and if Employer Plan can replace ten women with ten men 
each month for a year without raising wages, he will save approxi-
mately $14,563 in contributions.118 
The combined effect of Manhart's holding and dictum places 
Employer Plan in this position. As men move to Employer Sevplan, 
however, it may be difficult for Employer Plan to attract well-
qualified members of the less expensive sex. Nevertheless, he will 
continue to feel the pressure of contributing more to his retirement 
plan on account of his increasing number of female employees. 
Employer Plan might recast job descriptions and manipulate hiring 
and promotions so that women are paid less than their true mar-
ginal revenue products. Doing this, he would benefit in three ways: 
(1) he would save on wages by paying some women less than the real 
value of their labor, (2) he would save on plan contributions because 
his obligation to contribute is a fraction of an employee's wage, and 
1,8
 As the nominal contributor in a noncontributory plan, Employer Plan probably will 
perceive that he is bearing the cost of the plan, regardless of the extent to which this is true. 
111
 The derivation of this figure is as follows. At a savings of 1.4 cents per unit with each 
substitution, the monthly saving would be 1,4x8 units/hour x 166.67 hours/month, a net 
savings of $18.67 per employee/month. Substituting 10 employees per month per year entails 
780 employee-months, resulting in a savings of approximately $14,563. This figure illustrates 
savings based solely on the fact that a man is less of a liability to a retirement plan than is 
his female counterpart. It is likely that Employer Plan would in fact save more than the figure 
in the text because his new men would also be paid at a lower rate than the women they 
replace; as new employees, they would be less likely to stay on the job long enough to earn a 
vested pension; and they might be younger as well. 
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(3) he would improve his ability to attract well-qualified men be-
cause he could offer them faster promotions. To handle the in-
creased number of female employees, Employer Plan probably will 
have to reduce his plan's benefits or eventually lower his employees' 
wages, but this will reduce his ability to attract qualified men. In 
the short run, it would be easier for him to hire or promote a man 
instead of a woman or to reclassify the woman's new job so that it 
pays less than the actual market value of her labor. 
In reality117 few employers are likely to establish or to convert to 
1,7
 The Court noted in Manhart that the Department had had equal contributions since 
1975 and that there was no evidence that it could not compete effectively for sale employees. 
435 U.S. at 716 n.30. The trial court had issued the injunction only two weeks after the rates 
were equalized, however, and this was a rather short period in which to measure such an 
effect. 
William Frey's analysis, see note 58 supra, also bears on this question. Frey draws an 
important distinction between the short-term and the long-term effects of the Manhart deci-
sion and applies the distinction to both the supply of labor and the demand for it. The short-
term effect on supply will be the result of the temporary inelasticity of the supply of male 
labor. For a number of reasons, men will not change their jobs quickly: male employees may 
not realize that they are subsidizing women's benefits; a man may not be able to find a 
comparable job with an employer who does not require a subsidy; an older male employee 
may have invested too much in his employer's plan to justify changing jobs. Thus in the short 
run, to the extent that the real cost of retirement benefits falls on employees, men will be 
subsidizing women. As for the short-term effect on the demand for labor, an employer will 
know that women are more costly employees, but he is unlikely to risk wholesale replacement 
because of his fear of a title VH action. Even a scofflaw probably would not replace his female 
employees immediately because the cost of training their replacements would likely exceed 
any portion of the extra cost of women's benefits which fell on him. 
Offsetting forces make ManharVs long-term effect on the supply of labor difficult to pre-
dict. Men will prefer to work for employers who do not require them to subsidize women's 
benefits. A male employee of a firm that provided no retirement plan at all would have to 
purchase an annuity from a private insurance company with money on which he had paid 
income tax. The cost of taxes and of paying for the insurance company's profit might well 
make a man indifferent between an employer who offered no retirement plan at all and one 
who offered a noncontributory insurance plan. In contrast, women definitely will prefer to 
work for employers who have insurance plans and who employ substantial numbers of men, 
because the male-to-female subsidy will increase women's compensation. Of course, the 
greater the number of women who work for an employer with an insurance plan, the greater 
the cost to the men who work for the same company and, accordingly, the greater the men's 
motivation to change jobs. Thus, as this article notes, pressure from the supply side will tend 
to segregate the labor market in the long run. As for the long-term effect on demand, employ-
ers will hire the cheaper of two employees. To the extent that the extra cost of women's extra 
benefits falls on employers, those with insurance plans will prefer men to women. Because 
the Equal Pay Act prohibits employers from paying women less than men for equal work, 
this preference can be expressed only by hiring fewer women. The very jobs women will want 
the most—with employers who provide insurance plans—will be the most difficult for them 
to obtain because the employers will not want the extra costs their employment carries. 
Frey recommends approaching the problem from the demand, rather than from the supply, 
side. He suggests that Congress either prohibit insurance companies from distinguishing 
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severance pay plans of the type suggested in Manhart because em-
ployees, unwilling to receive so much taxable income in a single 
year,118 will resist them. Tax laws, of course, can be changed, but 
legislation making severance pay plans more attractive is unneces-
sary because IRAs appear to be completely legal under the dictum 
of Manhart and less subject to employee objections. If the sum of 
employer and employee contributions to a retirement plan is less 
than $1,500 annually for any given employee, the employer may 
follow one of two courses of action without the severance pay plan's 
adverse tax consequences to the employee: (1) any employer may 
shift money used for retirement contributions into wages and advise 
employees to open their own IRAs, and (2) some employers118 may 
open ERAs on behalf of their employees and directly deposit retire-
ment contributions. Given the economic and legal incentives to do 
this—reducing the cost of female employees and eliminating any 
temptation (felt strongly perhaps by rising managers who want to 
increase profits) to discriminate against women and to face the 
attendant risk of liability—some employers can be expected to con-
vert to IRAs and many employers who are instituting retirement 
plans for the first time will be likely to prefer IRAs to insurance 
programs. These problems may be avoided. 
V. ALTERNATIVES 
Faced with a Janus of their own creation, the courts can take one 
of three approaches to the conflict between the legal rules and the 
economic forces set in motion by Manhart. First, the courts may 
choose to ignore the problem, either because they hope that factors 
other than a desire to maximize income will motivate employers and 
employees, or because they actually are indifferent to segregation 
along sexual lines in insurance and noninsurance plans. 
between men and women or establish a compulsory, tax-supported, national pension program 
in place of existing private plans. Either suggestion would achieve its purpose. The sexual 
composition of a given work force would affect neither the supply of male labor nor the cost 
of compensating employees: men could not earn more compensation from some employers 
than from others, and employers would not pay out more in pension contributions for women 
than for men. Neither of these recommendations seems likely to pass Congress at the present 
time, however. Also, any benefit that would result might well be outweighed by the political 
cost of centralizing pensions or regulating insurance companies. While one may recognize the 
force of Frey's economic analysis, which shows that repudiating Manhart's dictum is not a 
complete solution, one may nevertheless prefer a partial solution that seems possible at once. 
Ils
 See I.R.C. § 408(d)(1). 
"* See id. § 408(k). 
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Second, the courts could limit Manhart severely. The case holds 
that counterparts' contributions to a joint contribution defined ben-
efit plan must be equal. It seems inescapable that counterparts' 
contributions to any other form of retirement plan also must be 
equal, for there appears to be no basis for distinguishing among 
employee contributions to the various types of retirement plans. 
The courts, however, may draw a line at benefits. They may choose 
to define equality in terms of total benefits, not monthly benefits. 
Indeed, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert126 arguably requires this re-
sult by suggesting that a fringe benefit program would be discrimi-
natory if it " 'worked to discriminate against any definable group or 
class in terms of the aggregate risk protection derived by that group 
or class from the program.' "121 Of course, because no economic or 
actuarial difference exists between a plan with disparate contribu-
tions and equal monthly benefits and a plan with equal contribu-
tions and disparate monthly benefits, any employer whose plan was 
banned by Manhart easily could achieve precisely the same effect 
by equalizing contributions but reducing the rate at which benefits 
for women accrue in the future. 
Third, the courts can repudiate the dictum in Manhart. The Su-
preme Court's rationale does not require that severance pay and 
IRA122 plans be treated differently from insurance plans. A sever-
ance pay plan instituted to provide a terminated employee with a 
financial cushion while he looks for another job certainly should 
provide equal distributions for male and female counterparts. 
A severance pay plan designed as a substitute for a retirement 
plan need not be permitted to effect disparate treatment of 
the sexes, for there is no significant difference between a severance 
pay plan and a conventional retirement plan. 
A retirement plan protects against both the risk of longevity and 
the risk of providing for the risk of longevity by saving and pru-
dently investing money for an employee and by guaranteeing an 
income for life to a retiree. A severance pay plan purports to protect 
only against the risk of providing for the risk of longevity; it saves 
» 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
'*' Id. at 138, quoting Geduldig v. AieJlo, 417 U.S. 484, 496 (1974). 
m
 Title VII's potential impact on IRA plans appears limited to cases in which the employer 
deposits money for the employee. Even with the Manhart dictum repudiated, if an employer 
offers no retirement benefit plan, each employee apparently can on his own initiative place 
up to $1,500 annually into an IRA. Counterparts ultimately would receive different monthly 
benefits from the proceeds of identical accounts. 
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and prudently invests, but it does not guarantee an income for life. 
By approving severance pay plans that accumulate equal amounts 
of money for male and female counterparts, the Supreme Court has 
implied that there is a relevant distinction between the risk of lon-
gevity and the risk of providing for the risk of longevity. It would 
seem, however, that no valid distinction exists. Why would a person 
want protection against the risk of providing for the risk of longev-
ity, why would he be concerned about amassing funds to support 
himself in retirement, unless he also wanted protection against the 
risk of longevity itself, unless he were concerned about the possibil-
ity of living long enough to need the money? Indeed, how could one 
protect against the risk of providing for the risk of longevity, how 
could one save and invest, without estimating needs during retire-
ment—without taking into account the risk of longevity? 
In terms of its effect on employees, a severance pay plan would 
be no different from a defined contribution plan in which counter-
parts' contributions are equal and the woman receives a lower 
monthly benefit than the man. In a severance pay plan an employee 
does, however, have a legal right to receive all of the assets in his 
account upon retirement, while an employee in a conventional re-
tirement plan does not. For several reasons this difference seems an 
insufficient basis for allowing disparate treatment of women. First, 
because some retirement plans allow for lump-sum settlements, the 
right is often not grounds for distinction. Second, the right is largely 
illusory because of the tax consequences of exercising it. Third, and 
most important, emphasis on this right ignores the fact that the real 
contributors to a severance pay plan, as well as to an insurance plan, 
may be the employer, the employees, or the customers. To the ex-
tent that the real incidence of the cost of benefits is passed on to 
customers or taken out of profit, men in severance pay plans would 
bear none of the cost of their pensions, while women would be re-
quired to bear a part of the cost of theirs. If this practice is unfair 
in insurance plans, it is equally unfair in noninsurance severance 
pay plans. Approving severance pay plans exalts form over sub-
stance. 
Holding severance pay plans to the same standards as conven-
tional insurance plans would present two minor problems, but both 
can be handled easily. First, genuine severance pay plans intended 
to protect an employee between jobs must be distinguished from 
severance pay plans that truly are retirement plans. The line be-
tween the two could be drawn easily because the former would 
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typically contain a relatively small amount of money, rarely more 
than a year's compensation, while the latter would contain the large 
balance necessary to fund many years of retirement benefits. 
Employer-funded IRAs always would be classed as retirement 
plans. Second, an employer expressly would have to contribute 
more money to a woman's severance pay plan account than to her 
counterpart's. This should not be objectionable because disparate 
contributions occur in effect in noncontributory defined benefit 
plans that provide equal monthly benefits for counterparts, and 
unequal employer contributions must occur in fact if defined contri-
bution plans are to provide equal monthly benefits. 
Repudiating Manhart's dictum would not avoid entirely a conflict 
between law and economics; a man could still earn greater compen-
sation from an employer with no retirement plan than from an 
employer with one. Yet disapproval of the dictum certainly would 
mitigate the conflict. And if men find the risk of providing for the 
risk of longevity to be real enough, the conflict between law and 
economics will be eliminated: rather than incur the greater costs 
associated with the absence of a retirement plan, men will be willing 
to absorb whatever loss belonging to a retirement plan with women 
might entail. Perhaps most important, by repudiating the dictum 
the courts would allow women to enjoy in fact the equal treatment 
that the holding of the case seems to promise. 
